Theme: Procurement
Access to information is a cornerstone of healthy, accountable and transparent societies and essential for democracy.
By improving the public’s ability to obtain and use government-held information, citizens are empowered to participate fully in democratic processes, make informed decisions, and hold their leaders accountable.
Access to information is vital in all public sectors, but particularly so in defence and security where high levels of secrecy combined with substantial public budgets greatly increase the risk of corruption. Transparency and access to information in this sector provides a crucial bulwark against the misuse of funds, ensures accountability, and maintains public trust.
Ahead of Access to Information Day 2024, we’re excited to share details of our upcoming report which provides a comprehensive overview of the state of defence transparency and access to information worldwide.
Our report aims to strengthen accountability by enhancing access to defence information, in line with our broader goal to ensure informed and active citizens drive integrity in defence and security.
Utilising our Government Defence Integrity (GDI) 2020 database, which assesses institutional integrity and corruption risks, the report offers a detailed assessment of global defence transparency and access to information, with a focus on defence finances including budgeting information and spending practices. This is particularly urgent in an era of increasing military spending. The latest defence spending data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) shows world military expenditure rose for the ninth consecutive year to an all-time high of $2.443 trillion in 2023. This represents an increase of 6.8 per cent in real terms from 2022, which is the steepest year-on-year increase since 2009.
Additionally, the report also includes a review of global standards for transparency that apply to the defence sector. This is coupled with insightful case studies from Niger, Tunisia, Malaysia, Armenia and Guatemala and a review of good practices. The report concludes with recommendations to enhance access to information in particular contexts.
We look forward to sharing the full report and the accompanying case studies shortly. Updates on the launch date will be provided via our X/Twitter and LinkedIn accounts.
This toolkit is designed for advocates, activists and stakeholders engaged in advancing good governance and anti-corruption standards in the defence and security sectors, as well as advocates working in neighbouring agendas, like development, human rights and peace and security. It provides practical guidance, resources, and best practices to navigate the complexities of corruption in the defence and security sectors.
Users can utilise this toolkit as a comprehensive reference manual, with sections dedicated to understanding key concepts, planning advocacy strategies, and implementing actionable initiatives. It also covers topics such as security sector reform, corruption in arms trade, military spending, but also stakeholder engagement and advocacy tactics, aiming to empower users in advocating for robust governance and transparency in the sector.
As world leaders convene in Washington DC for the 2024 NATO summit, Ara Marcen Naval highlights the need to address and prevent corruption in military spending.
As global insecurity rises, so does militarisation and defence spending. The latest data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) shows world military expenditure rose for the ninth consecutive year to an all-time high of $2.443 trillion in 2023. This represents an increase of 6.8 per cent in real terms from 2022, which is the steepest year-on-year increase since 2009. This sharp rise demands our attention and underscores the urgent need for greater transparency in military spending.
Transparency International Defence & Security has long sounded the alarm on corruption – a hidden threat in times of rising military expenditure.
Corruption in the defence sector is multifaceted. While bribery is the most recognised form, corruption also includes conflicts of interest, embezzlement, nepotism, sextortion, and undue influence. This pervasive issue thrives in environments characterised by secrecy and wealth – factors that are especially prevalent in the defence and security sector. Often deemed too complex and sensitive for meaningful external scrutiny, this sector is fertile ground for corruption when oversight is inadequate.
The rise in defence spending is linked with increasing corruption risks. Increased spending must be accompanied by vigilant attention to corruption risk. There is a strong indication that the relationship between defence spending and corruption is cyclical. In countries experiencing state capture – where private interests corrupt a country’s decision-making to benefit themselves, rather than the public – elites are more likely to prioritise military spending, further perpetuating corruption.
Many defence institutions worldwide are ill-equipped to manage the higher corruption risks that militarisation brings. Transparency International Defence and Security’s Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI), which assesses countries on the strength of their safeguards against defence and security corruption, shows one-third of the world’s top 40 highest military spenders face high to critical corruption risks in their defence sectors. Even if some high spenders may have stronger domestic controls, they often export arms to countries facing much greater corruption risks.
Evidence shows that countries spending more on defence as a percentage of GDP tend to score lower in the GDI, indicating higher vulnerability to corruption. The 15 countries with the biggest military spending increases between 2021 and 2023 fall into c moderate to high corruption risk categories.
As international insecurity rises, so does global defence spending. However, the hidden cost of this escalation is the proliferation of corruption within the defence sector. When defence spending rises in countries where corruption safeguards are not prioritised, the issue becomes more serious. Corruption in the defence sector undermines peace and security by diverting critical resources and eroding public trust.
To manage the corruption risks associated with defence spending, NATO and its allies should:
- Ensure comprehensive transparency and oversight of defence budgets, allowing the public to have a clear picture of spending plans.
- Implement controls to reduce the risk of funds being lost to corruption as budgets are spent, such as granting parliaments, or a parliamentary defence committee, extensive powers to scrutinise spending and publishing the approved budget in an easy-to-understand form.
- Integrate anti-corruption measures into arms export controls to prevent exporting arms to countries unable to manage corruption risks.
- Utilise good governance and transparency as a tool for deterrence against foreign or domestic threats.
Only by addressing and preventing corruption can we ensure that defence and security sectors genuinely uphold national and human security, rather than exacerbating insecurity and putting populations at further risk of harm.
About the Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI)
The GDI measures institutional resilience to corruption by focusing on policymaking and public sector governance in national defence institutions. The Index is organized into five main risk areas: policymaking and political affairs, finances, personnel management, military operations, and procurement. Each indicator is scored based on five levels from 0-100, and scores are aggregated to determine the overall corruption risk level, ranging from A to F.
Header image: Dragoș Asaftei – stock.adobe.com
The scandals that shook the world into action in 2001 to prevent the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) were often fueled by corruption. Arms brokers bribing government officials to create fraudulent export or import documentation played key roles in these schemes to violate UN arms embargoes.
In other cases, military or police personnel illicitly sold state weapons to insurgent or criminal groups for personal profit.
Several states are increasingly implementing new policies and approaches to better assess and mitigate corruption risks in arms
transfers and stockpile management. These laudable approaches, however, are still in their infant stages. There is also a lack of international coordination and cooperation on the ways in which corruption fuels arms diversion. It’s time for states to elevate their efforts to assess and mitigate corruption’s role in arms diversion by strengthening national and international action and cooperation.
As world military spending hits all-time high, findings from Transparency International highlight urgent need for transparency and accountability
April 24, 2024 – Rising military expenditure is outpacing countries’ safeguards against corruption and threatening national and global security, new research from Transparency International finds.
Trojan Horse Tactics explores the nexus between the risk of corruption in the defence sector and rapid militarisation fuelled by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, conflicts in the Middle East and the Sahel, and heightened tensions in the Asia-Pacific.
This comprehensive paper by Transparency International Defence & Security (TI-DS) examines the relationship between military expenditure and corruption through the lens of defence governance.
Analysis using the TI-DS Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI), which assesses nearly 90 countries on the strength of their corruption safeguards, combined with military spending data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reveals a clear trend. Countries that spend more on defence as a percentage of GDP tend to score lower in the GDI, indicating a higher vulnerability to corruption.
Additionally, the issue is becoming more serious. Data released by SIPRI this week shows world military expenditure rose for the ninth consecutive year to an all-time high of $2.443 trillion in 2023. This represents an increase of 6.8 per cent in real terms from 2022, which is the steepest year-on-year increase since 2009.
Corruption in the defence & security sector, including bribery, conflicts of interest, embezzlement, nepotism and sextortion severely undermines national security. These practices divert critical resources and erode public trust, weakening a country’s defence capabilities and stability.
Despite this, ‘defence exceptionalism’ – the idea that because of national security considerations the sector should be exempt from transparency norms – means that many countries neglect or completely ignore good governance standards such as parliamentary and civil oversight, accountability, and transparency rules.
Sara Bandali, Director of International Engagement at Transparency International UK, said:
“In an era marked by increasing militarisation, it’s crucial that we confront the deep-seated vulnerabilities to corruption in the defence & security sector.
“Our findings clearly indicate that rising military spending is linked with heightened corruption risks, which in turn threaten national and global security. Our previous research has shown how many defence institutions in countries around the world are ill-equipped to manage the higher corruption risks militarisation brings. If militarisation is to achieve the aim of upholding national and human security, these are issues which can no longer be overlooked.
“The evidence-based Government Defence Integrity Index not only identifies key areas of concern but also sets global benchmarks for accountability and transparency. We urge all countries to move towards these standards in response to growing insecurity.”
TI-DS calls on all countries to make transparency and accountability around defence spending a core aspect of the response to increased global insecurity by:
- Improving transparency and appropriate oversight of defence budgets to ensure that the public has as comprehensive a picture as possible of spending plans.
- Introducing controls to reduce risks of funds being lost to corruption as budgets are spent.
- Integrating anti-corruption measures into arms exports controls. This is to prevent exporting countries providing arms to countries which cannot demonstrate their will and capacity to manage corruption risks.
Militarisation is back on the agenda. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and amidst rising tensions in East Asia, the Middle East and the Sahel, governments around the world have been ramping up their defence spending. Where budgets increase, so does corruption risk, especially when sectors are lacking functioning transparency, accountability, and oversight. Evidence from Transparency International Defence & Security’s (TI-DS) Government Defence Integrity Index 2020 (GDI) clearly shows that most defence institutions around the world do not have the necessary resilience to withstand these risks.
This paper provides an overview of the nexus between corruption and increased defence spending. Studies that have looked into the link between corruption and military expenditure often relied on measures of corruption that were not specific to the sector. This paper aims to change that by utilising data from a tool that captures sector-specific knowledge on corruption risk. It combines data on defence spending from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) with indicator scores on institutional resilience to corruption in the defence sector from the GDI. The combination of these data sources offers new insights into the relationship between defence spending and corruption. The findings are of critical importance for all concerned about the implications of rising militarisation.
The rise in global insecurity is pushing many US security partner countries to reignite or revise a familiar but risky approach to expanding national defence industrial capabilities. Sometimes referred to as ‘defence offsets’ or ‘industrial participation’, this approach requires foreign defence companies to invest in the local economies of countries as a condition for the purchase of major weapons systems. Defence offsets can benefit local defence industries, but they also contain many aspects that make them particularly vulnerable to corruption. US defence companies are rapidly responding to these partner demands with increasing US government support and within an incredibly lax US regulatory environment.
April 11, 2024 – New research from Transparency International warns that the United States is ignoring potentially dangerous corruption risks around opaque defence contract payments (aka ‘offsets’) that threaten to undermine U.S. and international security.
As the U.S. escalates its defence collaboration globally, Blissfully Blind breaks down the complex web of corruption risks associated with offsets – financial sweeteners added to overseas arms sales in addition to the military hardware the country receives.
Offsets are increasingly common parts of international arms deals but the huge amounts of money involved combined with a lack of transparency, especially for offsets going to economic sectors outside defence, makes them especially vulnerable to corruption.
Defence companies are incentivised to offer big offset packages to secure lucrative deals. Foreign officials in importing countries may choose to buy from whichever firm they can personally gain the most, regardless of whether they offer best value for the people they represent.
Gary Kalman, Executive Director at Transparency International U.S. (TI-US), said:
“The culture of offsets in international arms sales may seem an odd practice to the public. Imagine the look you’d get from telling a car dealership that you’ll only buy a car from them if they help fund your child’s school.
“The corruption and other risks of these side deals are so great that, in most industries, the practice is banned. Yet, in the defence sector offsets are standard practice.
“At the very least, we need the type of transparency and accountability called for this in this report.”
Key Findings:
- The global value of defence offsets is projected to reach $371 billion for the 2021-2025 period, with U.S. defence firms estimated to provide between $36.5 billion and $52.4 billion for FY 2021 and FY 2022 combined.
- Among arms importing countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, the United Arab Emirates, and the UK all face high or very high corruption risk due to a lack of transparency, support for risky types of investments, and weak monitoring or enforcement around offset contracts.
- Other arms importing countries, including Australia, India, Israel, the Netherlands, Poland, South Korea, and Ukraine have specific high-risk aspects of their offset policies.
- Corruption in defence offsets can undermine efforts to obtain critical defensive capabilities, waste government funds, complicate U.S. government and defence company relations with key security partners and weaken citizen faith in governments.
- Meanwhile, U.S. defence companies show weak controls to prevent corruption in offsets. Many lack explicit policies and procedures to address the risks.
- The U.S. government’s ‘hands-off’ approach to overseeing offsets effectively leaves defence firms to mark their own homework. Regulation of offset agreements by the Commerce Department is inadequate.
This report comes at a critical moment. There are increasing demands for offsets from purchasing countries and greater collaboration with countries like the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Malaysia – all nations with minimal anti-corruption safeguards in their defence sectors.
And in the U.S., there are now moves by Congress to further weaken the already lax checks on offset arrangements by significantly raising the dollar value of arms deals that require congressional review before they can go ahead.
Colby Goodman, Senior Researcher at Transparency International – Defence & Security and author of the report, said:
“A surge in demand for defence offsets, inadequate anti-corruption measures by U.S. defence companies, poor safeguards in many U.S. partner nations, and lenient oversight from Washington has created a perfect storm of corruption risks, which has the very real chance of undermining any public benefit of the offsets to the importing country.
“It’s essential that these corruption risks are confronted and mitigated, with responsibility falling on both the U.S. and importing countries to enact meaningful reforms.”
The report makes a series of targeted recommendations to the U.S. government that would enhance the oversight of defence offsets and significantly address corruption risks, while also ensuring U.S. defence firms do not face unnecessary barriers to their business with international partners:
- Increase transparency by strengthening reporting on defence offsets and political contributions. Prioritize detailed private disclosures through the State and Defence Departments and establish an interagency task force to improve overall private and public transparency.
- Assess corruption risks by taking a proactive approach to mitigate corruption risks in offsets by reviewing agreements and conducting comprehensive studies on past arrangements. A focus should be on indirect offsets (investments not directly related to the equipment being sold in the contract) and partner country controls.
- Penalize wrongdoing by enhancing the investigation and prosecution of offset-related corruption, establishing watchlists for offenders, and enforcing strict penalties for non-compliance with reporting requirements.
- Encourage stronger foreign offset policies by urging U.S. partner countries to do the following: adopt transparent and effective offset policies, emphasize the disclosure of offset details similar to Australia, demand stricter oversight of high-risk activities, and ensure robust enforcement against violations.
Notes to editors:
Transparency International is a global network with chapters in more than 100 countries to end the injustices caused by corruption.
Blissfully Blind is a joint research report from Transparency International – Defence & Security, one of Transparency International’s global programs that works to reduce corruption in defence and security sectors worldwide, and Transparency International U.S.
The report was produced through a comprehensive approach that included reviewing U.S. defence offset laws and regulations, analysis of U.S. arms sales data and reports, and 30 interviews with industry experts, U.S. government officials, and representatives from partner countries such as India, Malaysia, and South Korea.
Defence offsets are side deals made between a purchasing government and a foreign defence company in connection with a major arms sale. They are an inducement offered by a defence company and/or a requirement by the purchasing government and would not exist without an arms sale. Offsets typically involve defence companies investing in the local defence industry or other economic sectors in the purchasing country. Offsets can be direct, that is tied to the specific equipment or service sold, or indirect, a broad investment unrelated to a specific contract.
Transparency International Defence & Security’s (TI-DS) 2023-2025 Gender Mainstreaming Strategy aims to promote the capacity of the organisation to mainstream a gender perspective and move towards good and best practice approaches of gender-sensitivity and gender-responsiveness. Gender-sensitivity ensures that TI-DS programmes, projects and activities reduce the risk of harms to partners and participants and reduces risks of reproducing gender inequalities. Gender-responsiveness is more of a pro-active effort to challenge harmful gender norms at the root of corruption and its impacts. Both approaches require attention to gender at every stage of programme cycles, from deign to implementation and monitoring, evaluation and learning.
By Patrick Kwasi Brobbey (Research Project Manager), Léa Clamadieu and Irasema Guzman Orozco (Research Project Officers)
Corruption in defence and security heightens conflict risks, wastes public resources, and exacerbates human insecurity. It is crucial to recognise the gravity of corruption in the defence and security sector and develop institutional safeguards against it. Against this backdrop, Transparency International – Defence & Security (TI-DS) is launching the 2025 Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) – the premier global measure of institutional resilience to corruption in the defence and security sector. This blog outlines what the GDI entails, its relevance, how it is produced, and essential information about the launch.
What is the GDI?
The GDI analyses institutional and informal controls to manage the risk of corruption in public defence and security establishments. The index focuses on five broad risk areas of defence: policymaking, finances, personnel management, operations, and procurement. To provide a broad and comprehensive reflection of these risk areas, the GDI assesses both legal frameworks and their implementation, as well as resources and outcomes.
Because of its focus, the index provides a framework of good practice that promotes accountable, transparent, and responsible governance in national defence establishments. The GDI is a critical tool in driving global defence reform and improving defence governance.
Previously dubbed the Government Defence Anti-corruption Index, the GDI was first released in 2013. Updated results were published in 2015, before the index went a major overhaul in 2020. The project now runs in a five-year cycle, so the new iteration will be published in 2025.
Gender: A New Dimension of the GDI
For the first time, the GDI will incorporate a gender approach. The 2024-2026 TI-DS Strategy acknowledges that corruption in the defence sector involves gendered power dynamics that produce different impacts, perceptions, risks, forms of corruption, and experiences for diverse groups of women, men, girls, boys, and sexual and gender minorities. In alignment with the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda, many defence and security institutions now recognise gender. Nevertheless, their efforts mainly focus on achieving gender balance, mainstreaming, and representation. There is a lack of visibility on gendered corruption risks in the defence and security policy agenda, as anti-corruption measures and gender concerns are often addressed separately.
Consistent with our commitment to addressing this, the 2025 GDI adopts a gender perspective to assess the gender dimensions of corruption risks in this sector. For this iteration, gender indicators have been developed and will be piloted. The gendered corruption risk indicators cover four cross-cutting themes: legal and normative commitments, gender balance strategies, gender mainstreaming strategies, and prevention and response to gender-based violence.
Integrating gender into corruption risk assessments like the GDI can help produce gendered anti-corruption interventions that recalibrate uneven power relations affecting people of diverse genders and minority groups. Additionally, it will help to identify evidence-based best practices in the gender, anti-corruption, and security space.
Why is the GDI important?
The GDI offers an evidence-based approach which emphasises that better institutional controls reduce the risk of corruption. It constitutes a comprehensive assessment of integrity matters in the defence sector and plays a crucial role in driving global defence reform, thereby improving defence governance.
The relevance of the index is enshrined in the rationale for creating it. The GDI recognises that:
- Corruption within the defence and security sector impede states’ ability to defend themselves and provide the needed security for their citizens. For instance, in Iraq in 2014, 50,000 ‘ghost soldiers’ were found in the budget – soldiers that existed only on paper and whose salaries were stolen by senior or high-ranking officers. The Iraqi forces were left depleted, unprepared to face real threats and unable to protect citizens and provide national security.
- The secrecy of the defence sector contributes to the wastage of resources and the weakening of public institutions, facilitating the personalisation/privatisation of public resources for private gains via defence establishments. According to the 2020 GDI, 37% of states in the index had limited to no transparency on procurements.
- Efficacious public institutions and informal mechanisms are central in preventing the wastage of state funds, the misappropriation of power, and the development of graft in the defence and security sector. In 2023, it was revealed that the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence was planning to overpay suppliers for food intended for troops. This led to official investigations and ultimately saw the auditions in the Ukrainian parliament pass legislation that enhances transparency in defence procurement.
These examples underscore the importance and timeliness of the GDI in rooting out corruption in national defence and security sectors.
How is the GDI created?
The GDI consists of questions broken down into indicators spanning the five corruption risks. These serve as the basis of data collection in countries carefully selected using the TI-DS selection criteria, which predominantly centre on the susceptibility of a country’s defence institutions to corruption. These countries will be drawn from the following TI regions: sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia Pacific and South Asia, and Western Europe and North America.
TI-DS uses a rigorous methodology consisting of an independent Country Assessor conducting research and providing an original, context-specific data that is accurate and verifiable. The data are then first extensively reviewed by a TI-DS team of topical and methodology experts before being sent to external reviewers (specifically, peer reviewers and relevant TI national chapters and governments) for additional quality checks. As part of its commitment to transparency, TI-DS has published the GDI Methods Paper that outlines the methodological and analytical considerations and choices .
Overview of the Launch
The 2025 GDI research project, which will be conducted in six waves representing the TI regions, began on Tuesday 26 March 2023. A webinar was organised for TI national chapters whose countries are in the first wave. This information session ensured mutual learning between TI-DS and the chapters. Other webinars will be organised later for chapters whose countries are in the subsequent waves.
TI-DS has secured ample funding for the sub-Saharan African wave of the 2025 GDI. However, as the GDI is of utmost importance and requires timely execution, we are working towards securing additional funding to cover the administrative and operational costs of the remaining five waves. TI-DS invites the stakeholders to get in touch via gdi@transparency.org to help support the remaining waves. Thank you.
March 28, 2024 – Transparency International – Defence & Security (TI-DS) is excited to announce the start of work on the next iteration of the Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI), the leading global benchmark of corruption risks in the defence and security sector.
The GDI 2025 is TI-DS’s flagship research product and follows on from the GDI 2020. This latest iteration includes expert assessments of around 90 countries as well as the introduction of a gender perspective, recognising the nuanced impacts of corruption across different gender and underrepresented groups.
The GDI provides a framework of good practice that promotes accountable, transparent, and responsible governance in the defence & security sector. It is a useful tool for civil society to collaborate with Ministries of Defence, the armed forces, and with oversight institutions, to build their capacity in advocating for transparency and integrity.
Countries are evaluated by independent assessors who assess the strength of anti-corruption safeguards and institutional resilience to corruption in five key areas:
- Financial: includes strength of safeguards around military asset disposals, whether a country allows military-owned businesses, and whether the full extent of military spending is publicly disclosed.
- Operational: includes corruption risk in a country’s military deployments overseas and the use of private security companies.
- Personnel: includes how resilient defence sector payroll, promotions and appointments are to corruption, and the strength of safeguards against corruption to avoid conscription or recruitment.
- Political: includes transparency over defence & security policy, openness in defence budgets, and strength of anti-corruption checks surrounding arms exports.
- Procurement: includes corruption risk around tenders and how contracts are awarded, the use of agents/brokers as middlemen in procurement, and assessment of how vulnerable a country is to corruption in offset contracts.
These independent assessments go through multiple layers of expert review before each country is assigned an overall score and rank. This makes the GDI extremely rigorous in its methodology.
The amount of work required to produce the GDI means the new country results will be released in six waves:
- Sub-Saharan Africa
- Middle East and North Africa
- Central and Eastern Europe
- Latin America
- Asia Pacific and South Asia
- Western Europe and North America
The first wave is provisionally due to be published in early 2025.
Notes:
The GDI was previously known as the Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index (GI), with results published in 2013 and 2015. The Index underwent a major update for the 2020 version, including changes to the methodology and scoring underpinning the project. The 2025 results can be compared with those from 2020 to get a picture of global trends in defence governance, and which countries are improving.
The GDI is a corruption risk assessment of the defence and security sector within a country, which assesses the quality of mechanisms used to manage corruption risk –and evaluating the factors that are understood to facilitate corruption.
It is not a measurement of corruption and does not measure the amount of funds that are lost to corruption, identify corrupt actors, or estimate the perceptions of corruption in the defence & security sectors by the public.
TI-DS has secured funding for the sub-Saharan African wave and is working towards securing additional support to cover the costs of producing the remaining five waves. We invite all stakeholders, including public agencies, multilateral organisations and INGOs, to get in touch via gdi@transparency.org to help support the remaining waves.
March 6, 2024 – Following the acquittal of two men charged with paying bribes to secure and maintain a major multi-billion-pound defence contract with Saudi Arabia, a full independent inquiry is now vital in order to examine the evidence presented in court of the British government’s direct involvement in these corrupt arms deals.
Despite it being accepted that millions of pounds of bribes were paid to senior Saudi officials in exchange for lucrative deals to supply military communications equipment between 2007 and 2012, the two former executives of GPT Special Project Management were today found not guilty of corruption after being prosecuted for overseeing these payments.
The two men had argued that British officials, politicians and diplomats knew about and consented to nearly £60 million worth of bribes to the Gulf state since 1978.
It is reasonable to assume that, in deciding to acquit these men, the jury gave serious weight to the significance of the evidence that was presented in court of the UK government’s involvement in the alleged bribes.
Josie Stewart, Director of Transparency International Defence & Security, said:
“This case involves Europe’s largest defence manufacturer, senior members of the Saudi Royal Family, and allegations of high-level involvement by successive UK governments about systemic corruption that went on for decades. The details that emerged in court wouldn’t look out of place in a Hollywood screenplay but sadly the reality surpasses fiction.
“Ian Foxley, the whistleblower who lifted the original lid, had no idea at the time how far the rot would go. Thanks to the court monitoring work of our partners at Spotlight on Corruption, we now have a good idea: it went far, and it went high. We now need to know how far, and how high.”
The case raises serious questions over whether any of the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) procurement staff queried the corrupt payments. If not, then why not? If so, then to what level and who authorised their continuity? And, who within the MoD authorised the decision to continue opaque payments that may have benefitted Saudi government officials after the case was under investigation?
Transparency International Defence & Security joins Spotlight on Corruption’s urgent call for a transparent, independent judge-led inquiry into the full nature and extent of the UK government’s knowledge of and involvement in these defence contract payments made to Saudi Arabia.
This inquiry must consider whether ongoing contractual arrangements are still at risk of corruption, what measures the MoD is putting in place to prevent this, and the adequacy of the MoD’s measures to protect and enable whistleblowers to uncover corruption. A temporary halt should also be placed on any arms transfer licenses approved by the same officials during the period in question until evidence of responsible and corruption-free arms control systems can be provided.
But this inquiry will not be enough, because this case is not an isolated incident. Enormous budgets, close political ties, and high levels of secrecy make the defence and security sectors fertile ground for hidden payments, undue influence, bribery, and corruption.
It’s imperative that we restore integrity to the arms trade in order to rebuild trust in our institutions, safeguard the public interest, and strengthen global security.
As this case shows, the UK, and governments in all arms-supplier countries, must take action to integrate heightened anti-corruption standards into arms transfers. The current controls are clearly not up to the task. They need strengthening with:
- Increased investment in proactive measures to detect corruption risks in arms transfers, including during the arms deal and licensing processes.
- Development of arms transfer policies that recognise corruption as a significant risk and establish procedures for investigation and mitigation;
- Comprehensive disclosure of all intermediaries, subcontractors, and service providers involved, and independent monitoring of all defence sector contracts in which official support is sought or given;
- Verification of recipient countries’ anti-corruption systems and inclusion of this verification as criteria in arms transfer/license decision-making; and
- Commitment to share information on corrupt recipient(s) to other arms supplier states.