Category: Responsible Defence Governance

By Michael Ofori-Mensah, Head of Research, and Léa Clamadieu, Research Project Officer

In 2024, global military expenditure rose for the tenth consecutive year, reaching an unprecedented $2.7 trillion. All five geographical regions of the world recorded an increase in military expenditure. Significantly, according to SIPRI, NATO members alone accounted for $1.5 trillion—around 55 per cent of the total global spending. This figure is set to grow further following the Alliance’s June 2025 commitment to increase national defence budgets to 5 per cent of GDP.

While this surge underscores the renewed emphasis on collective security, it also brings significant corruption and governance risks. Defence budgets are often shrouded in secrecy, with parts of spending channelled through off-budget mechanisms that escape parliamentary scrutiny and public oversight. As highlighted by UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres in his report The Security We Need, such opacity erodes political control over public finances; heightens the risks of inefficiency, corruption and mismanagement; and diverts resources from essential public services and sustainable development. Defence procurement processes -frequently among the least transparent areas of government – are also vulnerable to corruption, waste, and political capture.

This is not just a threat on paper – it is very much real: A recent investigation by La Lettre and partner news outlets brought to light how criminal networks exploit corruption loopholes to win contracts awarded by the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA), and how kickback schemes built a system of corruption between the NSPA and former staff. Pressure on audit institutions and lack of support for whistleblowers was found to further limit oversight and meaningful anti-corruption measures.

This moment presents a risk, but also an opportunity. The NATO Building Integrity programme, which works to promote good governance and integrity reform, has made a positive contribution. However, with unprecedented resources being mobilised, NATO member countries can strengthen transparency, accountability, and governance frameworks to ensure that all military expenditures serve their intended purpose.

To support this, we have has identified examples of best practice from across NATO countries, recognising that systems and approaches differ – but that valuable lessons can be shared. Drawing on insights from our Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI),  we highlight a selection of good practices across three key risk areas:

1. Policymaking: Defence sector oversight and civil society inclusion
2. Financial: Transparency in actual defence spending
3. Procurement: Integrity and openness in defence purchases

At the core of the examples is embedding integrity in the defence sector, defined here as “institutional resilience to corruption”, these cases demonstrate that strong oversight and openness are not obstacles to security—they are essential foundations for it.

Photo by Marek Studzinski on Unsplash

Policymaking: Oversight and CSO inclusion

Identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee exercising short- and long-term oversight

Members of parliamentary Defence Committees should comprise individuals with defence sector expertise experience in the field of security for oversight to be effective.  In terms of short-term oversight of the Defence Committee, the regularity of committee’s meetings, the depth of the debate as well as public access are key to promote efficient parliamentary oversight. In Latvia, the Defence Committee meets at least twice a week and issues budget amendments and recommendations which are developed in collaboration with ministries. Issues debated are legislative, including preparing draft legal acts and policy planning documents, and non-legislative, such as informative or investigative meetings. The same frequency of meetings is noted in Belgium, where the debates from representatives are also thoroughly documented and publicly available with dates and integral text of the debate documented in a question-and-answer format.

The Committee should also be able to conduct long-term investigations such as current defence activities or military operations like in the Netherlands and be able to invite ministries and other institutions to report on specific issues like in Latvia.  Once recommendations are made by the Parliamentary Committee, it is important that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) acknowledge and incorporate them. For instance, in the Netherlands there is first an internal debate on the topic at hand and external with the Ministry. If a specific Member of Parliament is not satisfied with the result of discussions, they can put the recommendation into a motion for the plenary to vote on. If the majority votes in favour, the ministry is obliged to implement the recommendation.

Policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption

It is essential that CSOs operate free from government interference and intimidation and more importantly that defence and security institutions engage and work regularly with them on corruption issues. This engagement can take different forms. In Norway, the MoD created the Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector (CIDS) in 2012 which seeks to promote and enhance professional integrity and good governance in the defence and security spheres. Its work includes collaborating with a range of CSOs. Moreover, in the Netherlands, military personnel often work together with civilians and civil society organisations, with expertise in public administration, government, law enforcement and justice, in mission areas. CSOs can offer practical and tangible inputs into the defence policymaking and accountability processes.

Financial: Transparency of actual defence spending

Good practice requires that all spending related to personnel, procurement, R&D and other categories should be disclosed with very few exceptions. In Latvia and the United Kingdom, actual defence spending is published annually in a comprehensive format and includes detailed explanations for all audiences (expert and non-experts). Good practice also requires MoDs to explain the variances between the published budget and actual spend. The UK, for example, publishes a 200-page report on annual accounts and performance with detailed expenditures and explanations.  Additionally, actual spending should be published within six months after the end of the financial year and scrutinised by an independent oversight institution, as in the case of the UK.

Procurement: Integrity and openness in defence purchases

Oversight of defence procurement

Oversight of defence procurement should be independent and effective.  In Norway, in addition to internal auditing of defence procurements by the Internal Auditor Unit and the Contract Audit section, external auditing is conducted by the Office of the Auditor General (OAG). The OAG may also initiate in-depth investigations of the defence sector. In Finland, the Parliamentary Committees also discuss procurement. These oversight bodies work free from undue influence from the executive or military.  In Finland, Latvia and Norway, the oversight bodies are active in summoning witnesses and documents, demanding explanations, and issuing recommendations and conclusions that must be followed. Moreover, they also publish reports on their findings, which are accessible to the public.

Photo by SaiKrishna Saketh Yellapragada on Unsplash

Transparency of actual purchases

Good practice standards in defence procurement requires that actual defence purchases are made public with almost no exceptions. The amount spent, reason for expenditure and companies involved should be also disclosed in an Excel format for readability. In Finland, all defence purchases are published on the ‘Hilma’ system – a digital notification channel where public sector buyers announce their upcoming procurement plans, ongoing tendering procedures and the results of tenders that have already ended; it is owned by the Ministry of Employment and the Economy. In Norway, all contracts above a set threshold must be published in DOFFIN (the Norwegian National Database for Public Procurement) and TED (Tenders Electronic Daily). In the UK, data on all spending above £25,000 is available in an accessible format, viewable online and published monthly.

Open competition

All procurement should as far as possible be based on open competition and the percentage of singled source contract be transparent. Additionally, in terms of oversight, all single-source procurements need to be justified and scrutinised by an oversight body like Supreme Audit Institution, as in the case of Latvia and Norway.

As military budgets surge across NATO member countries and beyond, the need for arming with integrity – strengthening institutional resilience to corruption risk – and embedding good practice standards in the defence sector has never been greater. Rising military spending can strengthen security but only if matched by equally strong systems of accountability, transparency, and public oversight. The examples highlighted show that practical measures—such as empowered parliamentary committees, open engagement with civil society, transparent reporting, and independent procurement audits—can make a tangible difference.

This event has finished, watch the recording below.

Global military expenditure hit a new high of $2.7 billion in 2024. 

Meanwhile, progress towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals is severely off-track in their tenth anniversary year.

As governments struggle with the impact of economic decline, trade and geopolitical tensions, funding for peace and sustainable development has shrunk considerably. Big spending hikes for defence are met with deep spending cuts on peace, development, good governance, and human rights initiatives.

Join us online on Wednesday 5 November, 14:00 GMT / 09:00 EST to hear directly from the authors of the recent report by the UN Secretary-General, The Security We Need: Rebalancing Military Spending for a Sustainable and Peaceful Future, as well as experts on civil society engagement and military spending.

We will explore the risks this imbalance in public spending creates, the impact on peace, security and development outcomes and the consequences for civic space.

Speakers

• Claudia Garcia Guiza is Political Affairs Officer at the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)
• Nan Tian is Senior Researcher and Programme Director of the Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
• Emily Wegener is Senior Policy Officer at Transparency International Defence & Security (moderator)

More speakers will be announced in the coming weeks

Register

The webinar will take place on 5 November, 14:00-15:00 GMT / 09:00-10:00 EST using Zoom webinar.

Sign up today to reserve your spot!

Unable to attend the live session?

No worries! Register to receive a link to watch the on-demand recording anytime.

Public procurement is a cornerstone of governmental function, a powerful engine for national development and economic progress. When executed with integrity, it serves the public good. Left unchecked, it can become a magnet for waste, favouritism, and graft.

At the Regional Workshop on Integrity in Public Procurement (on 27-28 August 2025 in Sarawak, Malaysia), hosted by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific and the State of Sarawak, we discussed with international and regional experts and government officials from Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines on how to design and implement procurement processes that resists corruption. The workshop, themed “Integrity in Public Procurement: The Key in Economic Growth”, highlighted key integrity lessons for procurement:

• E-procurement from the outset: Leveraging technology effectively is paramount to embedding transparency across the procurement lifecycle – from initial planning and budgeting to implementation and oversight.
• Integrity is a strategic investment: Robust integrity measures, such as integrity pacts, require initial investment but their long-term dividends in reduced corruption, increased efficiency, and public trust far surpass the initial costs.
• No exceptions: The risk of corruption escalates significantly when checks and balances are weakened or bypassed. This is particularly true when exemptions are selectively applied. Integrity standards ought to apply consistently and universally across all sectors and contract sizes.

Enhancing Integrity in Defence and Security Procurement

At the panel, “Enhancing Integrity in Defence & Security Procurement”, our Project Manager, Yi Kang Choo joined Professor Christopher Yukins from George Washington University and Lt Col Dr Maimunah binti Omar, Assistant Director of Contemporary Security at the Malaysian Institute of Defence and Security (MiDAS) to explore how transparency and oversight can effectively mitigate corruption risks in defence and security.

Yi Kang shared insights from the Government Defence Integrity (GDI) Index, which analyses corruption risks and institutional vulnerabilities in various facets of defence procurement. A key area of concern is offset agreements, which frequently lack sufficient scrutiny during negotiation, potentially leading to undue influence on decision-making in arms deals. Amongst countries analysed in the 2020 GDI, 53 per cent of countries globally have no law or policy in place to regulate offset contracts, and a further 59 per cent do not impose any form of due diligence requirements for these deals.

Furthermore, he pointed to the common absence of effective government monitoring and evaluation of the delivery of offset commitments. As outlined in our Defence Offsets report, the monitoring of offset programs is particularly demanding since it requires a correctly defined baseline scenario with a proper set of metrics to evaluate each result. The fact that offsets are sometimes expected to have social, technologic and other tacit outcomes, adds to the complexity of this task. Besides, drawing on the findings of our Unlocking Access report, Yi Kang elaborated on how the Tshwane Principles on National Security and the Right to Information offer a practical framework for striking a balance between ensuring public access to information and safeguarding legitimate national security interests.

Too often, national security exemptions are invoked in a vague, broad, and undefined manner, which curtail the timely release of critical information. This lack of transparency hinders public oversight and is particularly detrimental in a sector as critical as national security, where public interest is paramount. The Principles can be tailored to each country’s unique legal contexts and national priorities.

Thanks to UNODC and the organisers for having us. We are committed to continue working with decision-makers, industry, and civil society to raise the bar on transparency, accountability, and integrity in defence and security globally.

Written by Yi Kang Choo, Project Manager at Transparency International Defence & Security

As Mali’s military expenditure continues to grow, a new report from Transparency International Defence & Security (TI-DS) reveals institutional weaknesses in the country’s external auditing framework—undermining efforts to ensure democratic accountability in the defence and security sectors.

Titled External Auditing of the Defence Sector in Mali: Challenges and Possibilities, the report assesses the current state of external auditing in Mali, with a focus on its performance vis-à vis the defence and security sector. Drawing on data from a desk review and the Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI), the report finds that audit institutions in Mali suffer from performance challenges that manifest across its public sector mandate, as well as in specific failures related to defence and security.

Key challenges identified include:

• A fragmented approach to external auditing, with an overlap of institutional mandates and confusion over the roles and authority of each institution;
• A lack of access to information, particularly within the military, defence and security sector; and
• Weak incentives for institutional actors to pursue democratic accountability in security governance.

Whilst external auditing serves as an important mechanism for holding government to account, this can only be made possible if external auditors have access to information about the finances of the institutions that they are auditing.

The report stresses that while Mali has institutions with the legal mandate to conduct audits, their ability to operate effectively depends on access to reliable and timely information. The absence of both a Right to Information (RTI) law and a State Secrets Law leaves a legal void around what information can be shared, thus further weakening oversight roles due to the lack of transparency, particularly in military procurement and budgeting.

TI-DS emphasises that information sharing within government is crucial for the government to function effectively. In particular, procurement activities must receive appropriate oversight, and to do so, information should be shared with accountability mechanisms such as external auditors.

To address these issues and improve transparency, the report makes the following recommendations:

• Harmonise the external auditing function so that there is one primary entity with the mandate for external audits;
• Develop well-defined legal exceptions to access-to-information laws, ensuring national security concerns are balanced with transparency through public consultation and oversight;
• Legally prescribe information-sharing by the defence sector with other government tactors, concerning its spending and procurement activities; and
• Continue to collaborate with the public on various platforms building on previous successful efforts at citizen engagement by defence and security actors – with emphasis on information-sharing and trust-building.

As a result of the coup d’état of 2021, Mali faces an ongoing failure of democratic accountability, which is reflected in the absence of institutional checks on its rapidly rising military spending. This report underscores the urgent need to strengthen external auditing as a means of re-establishing oversight, promoting transparency, and restoring public trust in governance. Without credible audit mechanisms and access to information, efforts to curb corruption and ensure responsible security sector governance will remain severely constrained.

A French version of this press release is available.

You can read the report in full in English and in French.

At the side of the 59th session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva, TI-DS and partners co-organised a panel discussion to discuss solutions to the vicious cycle of corruption, human rights violations, and insecurity. Senior Policy & Campaigns Officer Emily Wegener shares takeaways and reflections from the event.

Security and law enforcement agencies are often the first point of contact between citizens and the state. When they abuse their power, the impact on trust and state legitimacy cuts deep. Corruption also diverts resources from the fulfilment of human rights and peacebuilding. This makes corruption both a human rights issue and a threat to international peace and security – yet it is not treated as such: anti-corruption measures are still often viewed more as a technical fix, rather than as a necessity to ensure the enjoyment of human rights and prevent armed conflict.

To mark the launch of ‘Sabotaging Peace: Corruption as a Threat to International Peace and Security’ last week, TI-DS co-convened a panel discussion with DCAF and the UN Human Rights Office (UN OHCHR) on ‘Corruption, Human Rights and Security: Strengthening Prevention Through Accountability’ in Geneva.  At this year’s 59th session, the Human Rights Council (HRC) will adopt a renewed resolution on ‘The negative impact of corruption on the enjoyment of human rights’ — a timely backdrop for a discussion examining how corruption in defence, security and law enforcement undermines the protection and enjoyment of human rights.

Sharing headlines from ‘Sabotaging Peace’, Dr Francesca Grandi, Head of Programme at TI-DS, called for the need for a paradigm shift in peacebuilding, peacekeeping, security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes. Current approaches prioritise stabilisation over reform and thus fail to introduce anti-corruption measures from the onset. Corrupt networks, however, don’t wait: they are quick to adapt and entrench themselves in post-conflict political structures. By the time a situation is considered stable enough to integrate transparency and accountability instruments, corruption has often already become endemic.

Upasana Garoo, Senior Advisor at DCAF, shared findings from the new report on Corruption Controls and Integrity-Building in Law Enforcement. She highlighted how corruption in law enforcement is systemic and strategic, and not just a consequence but also a driver of weak governance. Effective solutions should be grounded in an understanding of the political economy, aim at changing incentive structures, balance practicality with political realism, and be mutually reinforcing.

María José Veramendi Villa, Human Rights and Anti-Corruption Officer at the UN OHCHR, shared insights from a report published in March on the ‘Impact of arms transfers on human rights’, which highlights how the lack of good governance in the defence sector contributes to illicit arms transfers and diversion. The lack of transparency in the sector, close industry-government ties, conflicts of interest, as well as complex, transnational procurement lines exacerbate corruption risks in arms transfers. To mitigate these risks, actors should adopt a human rights-based approach to anti-corruption, which puts the victims at the centre and highlights that corruption negatively impacts a State’s ability to fulfil its human rights obligations.

Insights from evidence and practice on proven solutions

The problem is complex and widespread, but there are proven solutions. Key panel recommendations included:

• Adopt a human-rights-based and conflict-sensitive approach to anti-corruption: Design anti-corruption initiatives with the aim to prevent human rights violations and conflict, putting victims of corruption at the centre; and foster closer collaboration between national, regional, and international human rights, peacebuilding, security sector reform, and anti-corruption bodies, as well as coherence between policies and strategies addressing these issues.
• Ensure complementarity and a systems-based approach: Ground peacebuilding, SSR, and anti-corruption initiatives on political economy analyses that examine the underlying socio-economic and power systems, as well as the incentive structures driving corruption at different levels. Use PEA to identify gaps across the entire system and put in place measures that are mutually reinforcing.
• Build coalitions across the whole of society: Successful interventions managed to build ‘coalitions of the willing’ across media, civil society, government, donors and the private sector, to create the right structure of incentives and identify multiple entry points for change.
• Emphasize human rights due diligence in arms transfers: Encourage companies in the defence and security sectors to adopt human rights policies that included a due diligence process.
• Attach targeted conditionality to military assistance: Make the provision of military assistance conditional on transparency, accountability and anti-corruption measures (e.g. external audits, open contracting regulations, public access to information).
• Transform social norms: Examine the cultural and social norms that defence, security and law enforcement forces are operating in, alongside institutional weaknesses. Where corruption is seen as necessary, and is generally socially accepted, pair technical solutions with longer-term, transformative measures aimed at shifting social norms.

In fragile contexts, corruption is the glue holding together violent systems that have the power to block meaningful attempts at building peace and protecting human rights. Anti-corruption is a powerful tool to prevent and mitigate violence, conflict and human rights violations – if we put anti-corruption and conflict-sensitivity at the core of these interventions/approaches.

A landmark Defence and Security Pact between the EU and the UK is signed and with it a new chapter in post-Brexit relations begins.

As the dust settles on the symbolism, a more difficult conversation begins on how to turn diplomatic momentum into meaningful, accountable, and future-proof cooperation. What could a EU-UK defence pact deliver, and what should it avoid?

Public support is there, but so are the risks

Public and political momentum is tangible, but governance still lags behind. Support for closer defence ties is already mainstream on both sides of the Channel. Yet the oversight, safeguards, and transparency we apply in other sectors (like humanitarian aid) remain worryingly absent from discussions about European defence.

Over 60% of UK citizens support closer defence ties with the EU, a striking shift from past scepticism around joint military ventures. This opens a window for cooperation rooted in shared threat perceptions, particularly vis-à-vis Russia and US foreign policy. This newfound openness cannot be taken for granted. Unlike other policy areas (e.g. migration or trade), defence cooperation seems less politically “sticky”, but will remain so only if its outcomes are seen as credible, effective, and fair.

Industrial integration is not neutral

The potential for joint procurement and industrial collaboration is immense, but not without significant governance and sovereignty risks. The UK’s defence industry is deeply integrated with the US, raising concerns about how “European” future joint systems with the UK would be. British defence giants like BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce operate extensively within the US market, and their products often include US-origin components.

This matters because such components can carry legal and political restrictions on their use, such as the Arms International Traffic in Arms Regulations (AITA), which can restrict the export or operational use of any system containing components of American origin. In Ukraine, for example, these constraints have already had real consequences: certain Western-made systems cannot be used for long-range strikes or exported without prior authorisation. In this way, third countries may still retain veto power over how weapons are deployed, even in urgent wartime scenarios.

The EU-UK Defence Pact aims to deliver strategic flexibility and autonomy. For this to materialsie, any co-produced systems must be designed from the outset to be free from those restrictions. Otherwise, European states risk being politically aligned but operationally constrained.

Democratic oversight remains fragmented

European defence is still more ambition than architecture. While the EU has taken major steps toward greater coordination, defence remains a patchwork of national systems, divergent priorities, and fragmented oversight. The EU cannot currently fund military operations from its core budget, and procurement remains largely a national prerogative. Crucially, as defence budgets rise, governance gaps widen. NATO, the EU Parliament, and national parliaments exercise some oversight, but EU-level defence cooperation lacks a robust, integrated, and harmonised accountability framework.

Parliamentary scrutiny varies widely and even in member states with relatively strong national controls (e.g. Germany, where parliament must approve contracts over €25 million) there is limited political appetite to elevate or align oversight at the EU level. The EU can support coordination and financing, but lacks meaningful levers to enforce transparency or ethical standards across borders. The risk is that joint initiatives, procurement programmes, and industrial integration will advance faster than the institutions designed to govern them.

Strategic urgency Is driving speed, but scrutiny is lagging

The risk remains that political capital is spent on symbolic breakthroughs rather than institutional substance. Momentum should not override scrutiny. The summit may have delivered a strong political gesture, but all the critical legal and practical details—on access, conditionality, and governance—will only be hashed out in the months ahead. And behind the political consensus lie unresolved questions: under what conditions will UK firms access EU defence funds (e.g., the new €150bn SAFE facility)? How will rules of origin be defined for joint procurement? Can export control regimes be aligned to prevent governance loopholes? The current moment might be a “market-moving opportunity” for defence actors, but the investment case remains underspecified.

Also, speed must not come at the cost of integrity. Joint declarations are welcome, but mechanisms must follow. Political incentives may prioritise quick wins, especially in the face of domestic pressures. Meanwhile, divergent French and German views on UK involvement, and rising populist sentiment across Europe, may push governments toward optics rather than institutional depth.

Defence without accountability is a false promise

The takeaway was clear: cooperation must be conditional on transparency. With the pact now agreed, attention must turn to how it will be implemented. For this new phase of EU–UK defence cooperation to succeed, its delivery must match its ambition with transparency and accountability built in from the start.

At TI-DS, we believe that how defence cooperation is built matters just as much as what is built. The UK and EU have a shared interest in security. They must now demonstrate a shared commitment to governance. With new money, new mechanisms, and new threats, the time to embed transparency and integrity is now not after the contracts are signed.

Dr. Francesca Grandi, Head of Programme, Transparency International Defence and Security

The UK and EU are “never, ever getting back together”. But on 19 May, they will be testing the waters. In 2023, David Lammy floated the idea that a Labour government would “start dating” the EU again after the “very, very bitter divorce” of Brexit. That intent was later baked into Labour’s 2024 manifesto.  

On Monday Prime Minister Keir Starmer will host European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, European Council President António Costa, and the EU’s foreign and security chief Kaja Kallas in London – the first formal UK-EU Summit since Brexit. What can we expect? 

Defence and security cooperation as first step 

The first talking point will be defence and security cooperation, the least contentious of issues that the UK and EU are seeking to negotiate, focusing on Russian aggression, the unclear future of NATO, and the US’ reliability as security partner. They are expected to sign an agreement on defence and security cooperation, as long as old ghosts—like fishing—don’t wet the deal.  

Geopolitical and strategic considerations are not the only reason behind the willingness to close a deal. Readiness 2030, the White Paper for European Defence published by the EU Commission in early April, enables EU Member States to spend over €800bn on defence through changing its fiscal rules and introducing a new financing instrument. It also incentivises joint procurement – with countries and from companies based in the EU, Ukraine, or in countries with a special trade relationship with the EU (EEA EFTA States). EU accession candidates can be partners too.  

The UK falls in none of these categories. Whilst a small part of the costs can come from other countries for smaller products such as ammunition, missiles and small drones, this is unlikely going to be enough to satisfy UK defence heavyweights such as BAE Systems or Babock International.  

For a country with a well-advanced defence industry, and a government that has made boosting economic growth its primary mission – and whose success will likely by measured by whether it can make that happen – this is a huge problem. Likewise, the EU is losing out on cooperating with one of the most capable militaries in Europe who have a highly advanced defence industry, and access to a nuclear deterrent. 

Looking at the substance 

The contents of the agreement that is currently being drawn up by the EU Commission’s European External Action Service (EEAS), are still speculation. Rumoured is an agreement similar to the partnership that Norway has with the EU. This would unlock access to Security Action for Europe (SAFE), the €150bn loan instrument through which the EU Commission will fund joint procurement ventures. 

In such an agreement lie opportunities beyond economic growth. On the political side, it would establish a regular dialogue and joint consultation mechanisms between the two. Critical gaps in oversight, intelligence and information-sharing, and strategic planning, which were lost with Brexit, could be closed.  

This possibility brings renewed hope for the fight against corruption, as the UK lost access to the bloc’s data and information-sharing systems e.g. on corruption cases in arms transfers – a dangerous blind spot at a time in which both sides are seeking to massively increase their defence spending. Should access to SAFE loans and joint procurement be made conditional on transparency and accountability commitments, the UK’s eligibility to this instrument would bring further benefits to civic oversight of cross-European efforts to rearm rapidly.   

A promising start 

Whilst it is too early to say that love is in the air, rising security concerns have undeniably pushed both sides closer together. Amongst the many contentious issues yet to be negotiated, defence and security is the one in which the common interests seem to outweigh the differences. The UK needs the EU’s money to boost its economic growth, and the EU needs the UK’s expertise and capabilities on defence to build a credible defence. Economic interests might be at the forefront, but this ‘first date’ also yields hope for strengthened oversight and accountability in the defence sector.  

Emily Wegener, Senior Policy and Campaigns Officer, Transparency International Defence & Security

London – April 16^th– As armed conflicts surge and organised crime activity rises, a new report from Transparency International Defence & Security (TI-DS) and Transparency International US (TI-US) reveals how corruption is quietly but consistently enabling weapons to fall into the wrong hands.

Under the Radar: Corruption’s Role in Fueling Arms Diversion investigates over 400 cases of diversion across 70 countries and shows how corruption, including bribery, embezzlement, and abuse of authority, serves as a key enabler of illicit arms flows.

The report’s release comes at a time of intensifying global concern over weapons diversion. It shows how corruption-fuelled diversion has empowered organised crime, fuelled armed conflict and violence, weakened military effectiveness, and undermined governance and security around the world.

“Despite greater recognition of corruption’s corrosive effect on arms control policies, corruption has often been sidelined in efforts to assess risks of arms diversion like a detective ignoring key clues in a recurring crime,” said Colby Goodman, Senior Researcher at TI US and TI-DS and one of the report’s authors. “Some states’ actions in recent years to add corruption risk assessments are a critical first step to better tackling this global scourge.”

The report provides critical information and tools for states to help identify and mitigate corruption-fuelled arms diversion as they develop new national arms control policies and engage in ongoing discussions within the United Nations on curbing arms diversion.

“The vast amounts of weapons diverted to terrorist groups in the past war on terror is a stark reminder of what happens when governments lose sight of corruption risks in the name of national security,” said Dr. Francesca Grandi, Head of Advocacy at Transparency International Defence & Security. “As demand for arms imports grows amid increasing global insecurity, this report offers practical and effective tools for arms exporting countries to strengthen integrity in their export control systems. It should also help spark more serious conversations globally, at the United Nations and in other fora, about sharing corruption-related information to prevent arms diversion.”

Some of the reports key findings include:

• The theft or embezzlement of state-owned weapons for private gain is the most common type of corruption-fuelled diversion, accounting for over 350 cases. Bribery and abuse of authority remain a serious concern for diversion.
• Corruption facilitates diversion at each stage of a weapon’s lifecycle, including production, international transfers, active use and storage, and disposal. The active use and storage stage had the most corruption-fuelled diversion cases followed by the disposal, international transfer, and production stages.
• Many of the corruption-fuelled diversion cases resulted in devastating consequences for civilians. In more than 200 cases, military or security personnel reportedly colluded with illicit actors, such as insurgents or terrorists, in connection with arms diversion, which resulted in hundreds of deaths and injuries.

To address this urgent issue, the report offers key analysis and recommendations for states engaged in arms exports and imports:

• Strengthen national policies by explicitly identifying corruption as a key risk for arms diversion and developing implementation guidelines that incorporate targeted risk assessment questions that measure key, often overlooked defence and security institutional controls.
• Improve international collaboration on corruption in arms transfers by sharing information on corruption risks in arms transfers within the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) framework and establishing working groups within the ATT and other multilateral for deeper discussions on the topic.
• Support research and foreign aid to curb corruption-fuelled arms diversion, including funding studies on related issues and efforts to strengthen the integrity of defence and security institutions.

You can read the full report here: Under the Radar Corruptions Role in Fueling Arms Diversion

About Transparency International Defence & Security:

Transparency International Defence & Security (TI-DS) is part of Transparency International, the world’s leading anti-corruption Movement, comprised of 100 national Chapters and a Secretariat in Berlin. TI-DS is a global centre of excellence, evidence and advocacy dedicated to building integrity in the defence and security sector for the benefit of citizens, states, and the world. It is hosted by Transparency International UK and works with Chapters across the Movement. Since its establishment, TI-DS has worked to bring anti-corruption firmly into the global defence and security agenda.

For media inquiries or to request interviews with the report authors, please contact:

Amanda Coakley, Global Media & Communications Advisor
acoakley@transparency.org

January 15, 2025 – Transparency International – Defence & Security (TI-DS) today launches a series of policy briefs examining the institutional resilience of the defence and security sectors in Nigeria, Tunisia, Niger and Mali.  

Against a backdrop of democratic backsliding, political upheaval and mounting security threats, the briefs lay out clear, country-specific policy recommendations for tackling the corruption risks undermining effective defence governance and stability across West and North Africa.  

Read the briefs: Nigeria | Tunisia | Niger | Mali 

Michael Ofori-Mensah, Head of Research at Transparency International Defence & Security, said: 

“Transparency and accountability are not only moral imperatives but also practical necessities for effective defence and security sectors. The evidence outlined in these policy briefs clearly shows the effects of weak defence governance – where corruption is allowed to fester, peace and stability suffer. Our recommendations offer governments, policymakers, and civil society organisations a clear roadmap to tackle the corrosive effects of corruption on national security.” 

Each policy brief offers a blueprint for improved institutional resilience in the defence and security sector, grounded in data from our Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI), the world’s leading assessment of corruption risks in government defence institutions. 

 The analysis draws on: 

• Country-specific context: Recent political events, military spending, arms imports, and public opinion on governance and democracy. 

• Institutional resilience assessment: A breakdown of existing corruption safeguards and vulnerabilities in defence governance, informed by GDI data and comparisons with regional peers. 

• Policy recommendations: Practical steps, developed in partnership with Nigeria/CISLAC, TI Tunisia/IWatch, and TI Niger/ANLC for improving transparency, accountability and ultimately providing peace and security for citizens. 

Country summaries 

Nigeria 

Systemic corruption continues to plague the defence sector and cause a major hindrance to security in the face of significant threats. Defence budgets and procurement processes remain largely opaque. Decisive reforms to boost transparency – especially in military spending – and the reinforcing of both accountability and civilian oversight are key pillars for long-term institutional resilience. 

Tunisia 

Defence governance suffers from weak legislative functions and limited scrutiny over a highly centralised executive. With critical information restricted, parliamentary and civilian oversight remain fragile. Enhanced dialogue with civil society, clearer legal frameworks on access to information and a commitment to establishing best-practice exceptions for genuine national security concerns would go a long way to improving resilience against corruption. 

Niger 

A severe lack of transparency and oversight surrounds military activities, particularly defence expenditure, procurement and disposal of military-owned assets. Opening dialogue with civil society, strengthening accountability and embedding corruption risk mitigation into military operations are essential steps for rebuilding trust and stability amid the country’s evolving political landscape. 

Mali 

Systemic weaknesses provide opportunities for the diversion of military funds and influence-peddling, compromising both equipment on the front lines and broader political and economic stability. Defence procurement is shrouded in secrecy, blocking effective scrutiny of military purchases and how equipment is used. The release of key procurement information and auditing mechanisms are vital to creating sustainable institutional resilience against corruption.

Harnessing the power of collaboration, mutual learning, and knowledge exchange across our global Transparency International (TI) movement of over 100 chapters, Transparency International Defence & Security (TI-DS) launched Defending Transparency: An advocate’s guide to counteracting defence corruption in August 2024. To bring this toolkit to life, we organised a series of Academy Day sessions to foster dialogue and offer hands-on training on how to effectively advocate for better anti-corruption standards in defence and security. Our International Programmes Officer, Yi Kang Choo, shares reflections on the most recent session held in Bangkok, Thailand.

On 30th November 2024, we brought together national experts from six TI Chapters across the Asia Pacific region: Malaysia, Indonesia, Cambodia, South Korea, Pakistan, and Taiwan, for a dynamic one-day session focused on strengthening defence governance and anti-corruption advocacy through shared learning and collaboration.

The day began with an overview of the defence governance landscapes in the region. Chapter representatives shared their national experiences, highlighting challenges such as procurement practices, blurred public-private relationships in defence sectors, and limited civilian and parliamentary oversight. These discussions underscored the complexity of combating corruption and the need for innovative, context-specific solutions. Participants also candidly shared their frustrations and identified common obstacles faced by civil society in championing transparency and accountability in the defence and security sector.

One of the highlights of the day was the discussion of successful advocacy campaigns and the use of our 2020 Government Defence Integrity (GDI) Index. TI Taiwan demonstrated how the GDI alongside the chapter’s advocacy catalysed the formation of a dedicated team within the Ministry of National Defense’s (MND) Ethics Office to address the corruption risks identified in the index. TI Taiwan and the MND also co-hosted the International Military Integrity Academic Forum in 2023, fostering constructive dialogue on enhancing defence sector transparency. Similarly, TI Malaysia showcased how the GDI findings sparked public interest and facilitated further engagement with civil society in the traditionally closed and secretive defence and security sector.

These success stories inspired lively discussions, providing valuable lessons and strategies adaptable to other national contexts. We also shared findings from our latest report, Unlocking Access: Balancing National Security and Transparency in Defence. The report discusses how blanket national security exemptions are often used to justify withholding critical information, while public interest tests designed to balance the benefits of disclosing against the potential harm remain mostly absent from the cases considered. The report also features detailed case studies from five countries around the world at varying stages of progress in advancing access to information in their defence sectors, including Malaysia.

Finally, an interactive workshop followed, which encouraged participants to brainstorm and collaborate on national and regional advocacy opportunities, using the tools provided in our Advocacy Toolkit. Ideas such as fostering cross-border cooperation, engaging private sector stakeholders, and leveraging international forums like ASEAN and the Shangri-La Dialogue were central to the discussions. We also discussed how international transparency standards such as the 2013 Tshwane Principles could offer practical guidelines for governments to balance transparency and access to information with legitimate national security concerns. The session also reinforced the importance of regional and international solidarity amongst civil society in driving systemic change.

Throughout the day, the recurring theme was the importance of building and nurturing trust and partnerships. Whether engaging with defence institutions, civil society, or private companies, sustained dialogue and collaboration were seen as essential for creating lasting change. By the end of the session, participants left with actionable ideas, strengthened networks, and renewed motivation to engage on the topic moving forward. They were also invited to join our Global Defence Network, fostering further collaboration with like-minded chapters, civil society organisations, and experts worldwide.

Alvin Nicola (Democratic and Participation Governance Manager, TI Indonesia): “Fortifying alliances in the Asian region is an undeniable priority for all of us, TI Chapters. I am honoured to have the opportunity to exchange perspectives and explore collaborative steps that will further strengthen the integrity and stability of the defence and security sectors across the region.”

Dr Nausheen Wasi (Board Member, TI Pakistan): “Though, it was a brief interaction with colleagues in Bangkok, yet I thoroughly enjoyed meeting them all. I kept on thinking how the same work ideology — commitment to bring positive change in society — connects us all, regardless of diversity we inherit.”

The Academy Day reinforced our shared commitment to fighting corruption and enhancing governance of defence and security sectors in the Asia Pacific region. The lessons learned and partnerships forged will continue to guide our efforts to promote transparency and accountability in the defence and security sector. We look forward to deepening our collaboration and shared learning with Chapters across the TI movement to advance our vision of a world free from corruption in defence and security.

Defending Transparency: An advocate’s guide to counteracting defence corruption is available to read here.

Further insights from Armenia, Guatemala, Malaysia, Niger, and Tunisia illustrate access to information challenges

December 10, 2024 – New research from Transparency International Defence & Security (TI-DS) underscores the need for better access to information in the defence sector to curb corruption, ensure accountability, and improve civic engagement.

Published today, Unlocking Access: Balancing National Security and Transparency in Defence shines a light on opaque defence sectors worldwide at a time of increased geopolitical tensions and global military spending reaching record highs of $2.4 trillion.

Read the report

The report highlights challenges and good practices of transparency in defence budgets, procurement and policy processes using detailed case studies from Armenia, Guatemala, Malaysia, Niger, and Tunisia. The countries are at varying stages of progress in advancing access to information in their defence sectors and face a range of challenges, including conflict-driven secrecy, democratic backsliding, and stalled reforms.

Our analysis reveals that while international frameworks provide guidelines for transparency, implementation remains weak. Blanket national security exemptions are often used to justify withholding critical information, while public interest tests designed to balance the benefits of disclosing against the potential harm are mostly absent.

This lack of transparency increases the risk of corruption, mismanagement of funds, and fuels public distrust of the very institutions tasked with protecting citizens.

Michael Ofori-Mensah, Head of Research at Transparency International Defence & Security, said:

“The defence sector remains one of the most secretive corners of government, making it a breeding ground for corruption. Striking a balance between national security and the public’s right to know is crucial to ensure accountability, but far too often governments tip the scales towards secrecy. It’s time for transparency to be the rule, not the exception.”

Case study insights

Armenia has kept high levels of defence spending because of its decades-long conflict with Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh territory, which recently concluded with major losses for Armenia. Access to information was enshrined in a 2003 national freedom of information law but has been severely curtailed by the 2024 states secrets law, which prohibits the release of information related to most defence spending.

Guatemala has endured a growing corruption crisis for the past decade, as the presidency and the powerful Public Prosecutor’s office stifled anti-corruption efforts, forced anti-corruption officials into exile, and blocked potential reform candidates from elections. As the Secretariat for Access to Public Information is required to work with the Prosecutor’s Office on access to information enforcement, implementation of the law has faltered until now.

Malaysia saw a peaceful power transition in 2018, but governance reforms – including access to information – have stalled, with the Official Secrets Act 1972 (OSA) severely limiting access to information. The OSA functions as the de facto national framework for access to information and overrules any other legislation on information access. There is little knowledge about the defence budget or expenditures, and almost no publicly available information about acquisition planning.

Niger experienced a military coup in July 2023 that has led to increased violence, stark reductions in foreign assistance, and a severe curtailing of access to information and other democratic rights. Even prior to the coup, defence income and military spending were mainly non-transparent, as were defence purchases. But a new far-reaching law was passed in 2024 that excludes all defence matters from public procurement, public accounting, and taxes.

Tunisia has seen democratic backsliding since 2021 which reduced government transparency. Though a strong access to information law exists, defence-related information is often kept confidential. Still, Tunisia has a strong access to information law, with an effective independent oversight body that has helped to implement the law throughout the public sector.

The report offers specific recommendations for each of these five countries to improve access information which broadly fit into these categories:

1. Balancing tests: Legal frameworks should require officials to assess the public interest versus potential harm before withholding information.
2. Proactive disclosure: Governments should regularly and proactively publish defence budgets, procurement plans, and financial results to enhance accountability.
3. Independent oversight: Review bodies should be established to monitor and adjudicate disputes over information access.
4. Civil society engagement: Defence planning and policymaking should be open to civil society for broader input and oversight

Notes to editors:

The case studies in Unlocking Access were produced using an updated version of our Government Defence Integrity Index 2020 – the leading global assessment of the governance of and corruption risks in defence sectors. The data was supplemented by interviews with local experts, and the review of policy reports and media investigations.

French and Spanish versions of this press release are available.