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Russia’s war in Ukraine has made slow progress amid a catalogue of corruption-related blows to the morale of its military. Josie Stewart and Joseph Moore chart the stalling of long-standing attempts to control Ukraine.

When Vladimir Putin launched Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the early hours of that cold February morning a year ago, his plan represented a shock and awe offensive, aimed at encircling the capital Kyiv until the capitulation of the Ukrainian army and, eventually, the annexation of Ukraine. Even amongst Western observers, there was scepticism that Ukraine could effectively counter Russia.

This was the next step in a strategy which had already seen Putin spend two decades trying to control Kyiv through weaponised strategic corruption: enriching pro-Russian oligarchs in Ukraine such as Dmytro Firtash or Viktor Medvedchuk, who in turn bought up news channels, bankrolled political parties, and steadily built up Ukraine’s political and economic dependence on Russia.

But when corruption is used as a weapon, it can backfire.

Up until recently, the Russian army was praised as one of the world’s most powerful militaries. Today, one year on from the escalated invasion, having already suffered staggering loses with an estimated 200,000 dead and wounded soldiers, Russia’s ill-predicted quick victory seems a long way away.

There is no question that the war has not gone as Putin hoped. How much of this is because a reliance on corruption has come back to bite him?

Back in 2008, Russia embarked on the task of modernising its military forces. This process entailed a rapid increase in defence spending: 175 per cent growth from 2000-2019, according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. This peaked in 2016 at 5.5 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). That’s a lot of spending in a context where public sector corruption is rife.

Our most recent Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Russia 137th out of 180 countries and Russia’s military is not immune. Our Government Defence Integrity Index 2020 assessed Russia’s defence sector as being at high risk of corruption, due to the extremely limited oversight of defence-related policies, budgets, activities and acquisitions, in conjunction with high levels of opacity in defence procurement.

As a result, bribe money intended to buy a Ukrainian coup was stolen before it could leave Russian hands, soldiers on the front line were provided with ration packs seven years out of date, crowdsourcing for body armour was required for troops not properly equipped for the war, fuel was sold on the black market before it could power Russian tanks and supply chains failed. Ultimately as a result of this all –  Russian morale suffered.

The UK Ministry of Defence’s intelligence updates further supported this and flagged ‘corruption amongst commanders’, with the “Russian military… consistently [failing] to provide basic entitlements to troops deployed in Ukraine… almost certainly contributing to the continued fragile morale of much of the force.” The Head of Ukraine’s National Agency on Corruption Prevention of Ukraine (NACP) also expressed his “sincere gratitude” to Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu – who is alleged to own property worth at least $18 million (somehow reportedly acquired on his official annual salary of $120,000) – for the “invaluable contribution” Russian embezzlement had provided in better enabling the defence of Ukraine.

In contrast to the corruption-related problems that have plagued the effectiveness of Russia’s Army from the start, Ukraine has invested in improving oversight and accountability, action initiated following the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Our colleagues at the Independent Defence Anti-Corruption Committee (NAKO) have been working closely with the Ukrainian Government on this since 2016. Ukraine is continuing to fight corruption at the same time as fighting on the battlefield. With the stakes this high, they know they must win on both fronts.

At Transparency International Defence and Security we have long argued that a failure to strengthen defence governance together with increases in defence spending increases the risk of corruption – and that corruption in defence undermines military effectiveness. In other words: it’s not just how much you spend that determines the outcome. Russia’s challenges in Ukraine only reinforce this argument.

In response to the EU-NATO joint declaration on co-operation in responding to common security threats, Josie Stewart, Director of Transparency International Defence and Security, said

The war in Ukraine has renewed focus on collective defence. The security of the European Union depends on effective, transparent and accountable defence institutions, capable of guarding against corruption risks and consolidating mutual trust among member states.

While EU member states have in place many strong structures for enabling good governance in defence sectors, our Government Defence Integrity Index highlights vulnerabilities that exist in defence procurement systems in nations as diverse as France, Hungary and Poland.

The EU-NATO Declaration made this month acknowledges the importance of transparency in terms of joint decision making between the two organisations and member states. To ensure opportunity for oversight and civil society engagement, it is crucial that these principles of transparency and openness are fully upheld.

The EU as an institution also has a responsibility to ensure understanding and mitigation of corruption risk is built into its security processes and actions.

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Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) are a growing presence globally. They act as ‘shadow armies’, operating without transparency and free from legal accountability for their actions in conflict zones around the world.

Since the US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the industry has expanded from an estimated value of US$100 billion in 2003 to US$224 billion in 2020.

Such is the power PMSCs wield, there is an urgent need for United Nations members states to collectively commit to regulate, investigate and prosecute misconduct by these firms.

It is against this backdrop that Transparency International Defence and Security is bringing policymakers together at a hybrid event, open for registration now, to highlight this issue and catalyse change.

Many of the largest PMSCs were founded in the United States and Europe. But sophisticated PMSCs are increasingly being established in a variety of countries ranging from Australia to China, India to Israel, and Turkey to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The Russian Wagner Group is operating in many African countries and the network’s grip on matters of national security is tightening.

PMSCs are not merely providing ‘bodies’ and direct combat services. They sell services such as intelligence, surveillance and cyber security. This expansion in services has elevated corruption and conflict risks in many countries with critically weak protection to guard against defence and security sector corruption.

Required response

In response to these trends, a United Nations Intergovernmental Working Group on PMSCs is debating an international framework to regulate their activities.

Currently the internationally supported but non-binding Montreux Document encourages countries to refrain from hiring PMSCs that have a record of engaging in bribery and corruption, among other crimes. While it is a step in the right direction, it lacks teeth.

Some countries, such as the United States, Australia and New Zealand are also exploring new regulations and laws at national level.

These are positive moves. However, until international and national legislation is formally agreed upon, the kind of law-breaking carried out by PMSCs such as land grabs facilitated through corruption and violence against civilians,  documented in our latest research paper, will continue.

In Washington this month Transparency International Defence and Security will be convening a workshop to galvanise international support for anti-corruption standards for PMSCs. Chaired by Transparency International co-founder Peter Conze, the event is being held as part of the influential International Anti-Corruption Conference.

We will be making the case for the UN to establish:

  • Clear complaint mechanisms and standards to protect whistle blowers
  • A requirement of reporting on beneficial ownership of PMSCs and subcontracting by PMSCs
  • Increased transparency of contracts and enhanced reporting on exports of PMSC services to enable external oversight and accountability, including procurement and transfers of weapons and equipment in line with arms control requirements
  • Heightened oversight at the higher level of states institutions. For example, the State and Defense Department should establish accessible whistleblowing channels and regularly monitor their use, at a minimum

As the event is being held in Washington, we will also share a roadmap for progressing US legislation, highlighting the need for:

  • The definition of defence services to be expanded to include combat activities and potentially intelligence services, so that US companies and individuals must obtain US government authorisation (or a licence) to export such services
  • More detailed reporting to Congress on defence service exports, including listing the specific types of authorised defence service and associated dollar value for each country
  • Enhanced policy guidance for the State Department to assess the risks of corruption before approving a contract or license for PMSC services abroad

It’s time for PMSCs to be brought out of the shadows. Join us.

In response to reports the United Kingdom’s new National Security Bill could offer ministers immunity from enabling torture abroad, Josie Stewart, Director of Transparency International Defence and Security, said:

“If the UK wants to maintain its leadership role advocating for integrity in military institutions worldwide it must maintain the same stringent accountability standards in its operations abroad as at home. Cases of wrongdoing and malpractice must be investigated and prosecuted through formal processes, without undue political influence.”

By Dr Jelena Aparac, the UN’s Independent Expert on its Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries and Ara Marcen Naval, Head of Advocacy at Transparency International Defence and Security.

The Russian network Wagner, which has spawned shadowy mercenary groups operating in conflict zones around the word, has just opened its first headquarters in Saint Petersburg.

From the battlefields of Ukraine to the ongoing conflicts in South Sudan and the war in Yemen, private military security companies and their corporate partners are flourishing from conflict. Despite the deadly force they fuel, these firms remain subject to scant regulation and accountability.

Next week [December 1 – December 2], the United Nations will stage talks on the dangers posed by the Wagner network and other private military and security companies. Governments recognised and began talking about the need to better regulate the activities of non-state security outfits back in 2008. Well over a decade on, they’re still talking.

In that time, the industry has grown to be worth US$224 billion. That figure is expected to double by 2030. New groups are proliferating, seizing on opportunities to make money from conflict hotspots.

Russian contractors, subject this summer to gold smuggling investigations in Sudan. Wagner, perhaps the world’s most notorious network operating in this sector – often through elusive and locally-registered companies that use an alphabet soup of opaque brand names – has meanwhile been accused of murdering civilians in Central African Republic, in Libya, and more recently in Ukraine.

Latest research from Transparency International Defence and Security underscores the myriad threats that leaving this growing sector unregulated pose on a global level.

Contractors are expanding their sales of surveillance, armed security and military training to many countries around the world, often including nations that have critically weak protections against defence sector corruption.

This growing industry, while sometimes providing necessary or benign support to the keeping of security and safeguarding of rights, has the potential to infringe international law, and insufficient oversight and regulation risks personnel engaging in corrupt conduct or human rights abuses.

Recent reports point to firms perpetrating suspected war crimes in Mozambique. In Libya and Yemen, claims have been made that groups are engaging in cyber-attacks against political opponents, human rights activists, and journalists, and almost always linked to the exploitation of natural resources.

As firms seek to expand opportunities, they are increasingly taking on activities in new areas, such as security around border controls and for mining industries. These often require technical and logistical support, opening the door to bribes to politically connected sub-contractors.

This outsourcing of one of the primary responsibilities of the state, the provision of security, is worrying. And efforts to respond to the risks are falling flat.

Initiatives such as the publication of the Montreux Document, which outlines the theoretical and non-legally binding responsibilities of states, have proven out of step with the risks posed, largely due to the non-binding nature. Similarly, the industry’s Code of Conduct only encourages voluntary standards to be upheld by the companies it audits and certifies.

With the ever-accelerating rise of Wagner, the time to move from words to the establishment of robust international rules and regulation that provide transparency and accountability for victims around the globe has surely arrived.

Responding to reports related to Wagner interference in the US mid-term elections, Transparency International Defence and Security Director Josie Stewart said:

“Russian private military security contractors (PMSCs) are critical to the geopolitical goals of the Kremlin. Beyond providing frontline force, logistical support and targeted surveillance, groups such as these from Russia and around the world are now expanding their services to cyber and disinformation warfare. The lack of a clear legal architecture provides a licence to PMSCs around the world to take further steps in this direction. As set out in our report Hidden Costs – US Private Military and Security Companies and the Risks of Corruption and Conflict, there is a pressing need to regulate, investigate and where necessary prosecute these private military and security companies, ensuring they are always held accountable for their actions.”

 

press@transparency.org.uk
+ 44 (0)20 3096 7695
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Work is underway to shape policies necessary for the prevention of further coups in Mali, following two recent military takeovers of the west African nation.

Mali has been operating under what leaders have described as a period of “transitional” military governance since August 2020, with elections repeatedly delayed.

Transparency International is embarking on a new project aimed at establishing policies that would prevent future coups being carried out and see corruption threats mitigated in the nation’s defence and security sector, assessed as “high risk” through our Government Defence Integrity Index.

The initiative supported by the United Nations Democracy Fund aims to empower ordinary Malians and their civil society organisations to “exercise oversight” and engage with government representatives and defence institutions in reforming defence governance.

Legislative foundations will be laid in preparation for the resumption of parliamentary work following a two year hiatus that has seen female representation in positions of political influence shrink to zero.

‘Power to convene’

The project will be delivered through a partnership between Transparency International’s national chapter — CRI 2002 — and TI-UK.

Working together we combine national level civil society legitimacy, contextual understanding and power to convene with global expertise in corruption in the defence sector.

We will partner with local journalists and with a civil society network — the CSO Forum created under the previous UNDEF project — while expanding the project’s reach to all 10 of the country’s regions.

We will present policy recommendations to the National Transition Council (NTC), with whom we are already engaged, to integrate into legislation once the National Assembly resumes.

Three-pronged approach

Our approach is underpinned by three activities:

  • In-depth research into the role that corruption can play in facilitating military coups. The paper we produce will identify policy recommendations to anticipate and prevent future coups in Mali. It will also signpost risks to other countries facing similar challenges.
  • Analysis of the defence sector’s performance during the COVID-19 emergency. Our briefing will focus on the impact of corruption during emergencies and how it undermines the country’s capacity to respond to disasters. The analysis will include policy recommendations that can inform disaster risk reduction (DRR) interventions.
  • An advocacy program for CSOs to facilitate engagement with the National Transition Council and defence institutions. This will encourage integration of policy recommendations into legislation.

 

New research from Transparency International Defence & Security warns of high corruption risk across CEE region

 

December 9 – Decades of progress towards greater democratisation across Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) threatens to be undone unless urgent steps are taken to safeguard against corruption, new research from Transparency International warns.

The Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) finds more than half of the 15 countries assessed in the region face a high risk of corruption in their defence and security sectors.

Released today, Progress [Un]Made identifies region-wide issues which provide fertile ground for corruption and the deterioration of governance. These include weak parliamentary oversight of defence institutions, secretive procurement processes that hide spending from scrutiny, and concerted efforts to reduce transparency and access to information.

These issues are compounded by the huge amounts of money involved, with spiralling military expenditure in the CEE region topping US$104 billion in 2019 as many states continue to modernise their defence and security forces. The 15 states featured in the report are responsible for a quarter of this total with the majority increasing their defence budgets in the last decade.

 

Natalie Hogg, Director of Transparency International – Defence & Security, said:

Following major strides towards more robust defence governance in Central and Eastern Europe, many of these results should be a cause for concern. Corruption and weak governance in the defence and security sector is dangerous, divisive and wasteful. While it is encouraging to see a handful of countries score well the overall picture for the region is one of high corruption risk, especially around defence procurement – an area responsible for huge swathes of public spending.”

 

The GDI provides a detailed assessment of the corruption risks in national defence institutions by scoring each country out of 100 across five key risk areas: financial, operational, personnel, political, and procurement. Highlights from the CEE results include:

  • Average score for the region is 48/100, indicating a high risk of corruption.
  • Montenegro is judged to be at ‘very high’ risk with a score of 32, while Azerbaijan’s score of just 15 places it in the ‘critical’ risk category.
  • High levels of transparency see Latvia fare the best in the region, with a score of 67 indicating a low risk of corruption.
  • Authoritarian governments have weakened parliamentary oversight (Poland) and restricted access to information regimes (Hungary), closing off a key sector off from public debate and oversight.

 

 

We identify five key themes that are increasing corruption risk across the region, including:

Weak parliamentary oversight

Parliamentary oversight of defence is a key pillar in enforcing transparency and accountability but only two of the 15 countries we assessed have retained truly robust parliamentary oversight.

CEE regional average score: 51/100 (Moderate risk)

Best performers: 1) Latvia: 94/100 (Very low risk); 2) Lithuania: 83/100 (Very low risk)

Worst performers: 1) Azerbaijan 12/100 (Critical risk); 2) Hungary 27/100 (Very high risk)

 

Opaque procurement processes

Allowing companies to bid for defence contracts helps reduce the opportunities for corruption and ensure best value for taxpayers, but our analysis highlights that open competition in this area is still the exception rather than the norm.

CEE regional average score: 47/100 (High risk)

Best performers: 1) North Macedonia 82/100 (Low risk); 2) Estonia: 74/100 (Low risk)

Worst performers: 1) Azerbaijan 8/100 (Critical risk); 2) Hungary 14/100 (Critical risk)

 

Attacks on access to information regimes

Access to information is one of the basic principles of good governance, but national security exemptions and over-classification shield large parts of the defence sector from public view.

CEE regional average score: 55/100 (Moderate risk)

Best performers: 1) Georgia, Latvia, North Macedonia, Poland 88/100 (Very low risk); 2) Lithuania: 75/100 (low risk)

Worst performers: 1) Azerbaijan 13/100 (Critical risk); 2) Hungary 25/100 (Very high risk)

 

To make real progress and strengthen the governance of the defence sector in the region, Transparency International calls on governments across the region to:

  • Respect the independence of parliaments and audit institutions and provide them with the information and time they need to perform their crucial oversight role.
  • Overhaul their procurement systems to ensure more competition and transparency.
  • Guarantee transparent and effective access to information and implement a clear rationale on the use of the national security exception, as well as transparency over how the rationale is applied.

 

Notes to editors:

Progress [Un]Made – Defence Governance in Central and Eastern Europe can be downloaded here.

The CEE region spent US$104 billion on defence and security in 2019. This total includes Russia, which spent US$65 billion. Lithuania and Latvia increased military spending by 232 per cent and 176 per cent respectively between 2010 and 2019, and Poland by 51 per cent over the same period. Armenia and Azerbaijan consistently spend close to 4% of GDP on defence and are among the most militarised countries in the world.

Whilst defence governance standards in Europe are some of the most robust globally, states in Central and Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, where a combination rising defence budgets and challenges to democratic institutions, are particularly vulnerable to setbacks to their recent progress in governance and development.

In Armenia, Albania, Hungary, Kosovo, Montenegro, Poland and Serbia, there is a notable tendency for parliaments to align themselves with the executive on defence matters, for example by passing executive-sponsored legislation with no or only minor amendments.

In Georgia, secret procurement accounted for 51 per cent of total procurement procedures from 2015-2017. In Ukraine that figure is 45 per cent, while in Poland it is as high as 70 per cent. In Lithuania, open competition accounted for as little as 0.5 per cent of procurement procedures, with upwards of 93 per cent of defence procurement conducted through restricted tenders and negotiated procedures.

In Hungary, the government has made it harder to access information by skewing the rules in favour of public bodies and imposing new fees on those who lodge requests. In Estonia, the 2013 access to information act contained 7 exceptions, with 1 related to defence; by 2018, there were 26 exceptions, with 7 related to defence. Just three of the 15 states we assessed – Lithuania, Latvia and Georgia – were found to have been responding to freedom of requests promptly and mostly in full.

 

About Transparency International

Through chapters in more than 100 countries, Transparency International has been leading the fight against corruption for the last 27 years.

About the Government Defence Integrity Index

The GDI is the only global assessment of the governance of and corruption risks in defence sectors, based upon 212 indicators in five risk categories: political, financial, personnel, operations and procurement.

The Central and Eastern Europe wave includes assessments for 15 countries: Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Serbia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo, Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia. All states are either EU/NATO members or accession/partner states.

The GDI was previously known as the Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index (GI). The Index underwent a major update for the 2020 version, including changes to the methodology and scoring underpinning the project. This means overall country scores from this 2020 version cannot be accurately compared with country scores from previous iterations of the Index.

Subsequent GDI results will be released in 2021, covering Latin America, G-20 countries, the Asia Pacific region, East and Southern Africa, and NATO+.

Contact:

Harvey Gavin

harvey.gavin@transparency.org.uk

+44 (0)20 3096 7695

+44 (0)79 6456 0340 (out of hours)

 

 

Download as PDF: Statement on the killing of George Floyd, protests in the United States, and the need for transparency in related military deployments

 

June 10, 2020 – Transparency International – Defense & Security stands in solidarity with those demanding justice, equality, accountability and an end to racism worldwide following the killing of George Floyd while in the custody of police officers in Minneapolis on May 25.

In response to the resulting protests seen across the United States, the National Guard has been activated in 23 states throughout the country to assist local law enforcement agencies in the policing of protests, while some active duty military units were temporarily deployed to the National Capitol Region to potentially assist federal authorities.  On June 2, the president announced he was “dispatching thousands and thousands of heavily armed soldiers, military personnel, and law enforcement officers to stop the rioting, looting, vandalism, assaults, and the wanton destruction of property”. According to news reports, 17,000 National Guard members had been deployed, approximately the same number as active-duty US troops currently serving in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan.  This is in addition to 45,000 members of the National Guard who have already been deployed across all 50 states in response to the COVID-19 crisis.

The challenges and responsibilities faced by the armed forces in complex times are significant as they seek to protect their fellow citizens as well as prevent the violence and property damage that have occurred in some metropolitan areas.  The statements by a number of current and former military leaders reminding servicemembers of the importance of American values and their oath to support and defend the Constitution and the citizens whom they serve send an important message.

It is during times such as these that transparency and oversight matter most to ensure that actions undertaken are accountable to the public. Some of these deployments present challenges in terms of protecting the right to peaceful protests alongside the duty to protect lives and livelihoods.

After days of scrutiny over the militarization of the police response, including the use of National Guard personnel to forcibly clear Lafayette Square of peaceful protestors on June 1,  Secretary of Defense Mark Esper and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley appear to have refused a request to testify to the House Armed Services Committee. This response shows a disregard to the key guiding principles of transparency, oversight and accountability, as enshrined in the constitutional system of checks and balances.

Transparency International – Defense & Security calls on all governments around the world to instil greater transparency in all aspects of civil-military relations and to ensure responsible use of military by political leaders. To the government of the United States, we make the following recommendations based on established best practice in the defense and security sectors:

 

  • Ensure that all law enforcement agencies responding to protests, including components of the military when performing law enforcement duties, receive additional training and facilitate the right of peaceful public assembly.

 

  • Commit to the principles of transparency and accountability and ensure that Secretary of Defense Mark Esper and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley fulfil all oversight requirements.

 

  • Resist any inclination by those who lead the security sector to limit engagement with citizens in response to this crisis. Trust can only be enhanced through more interaction, not less.

 

Transparency International – Defense & Security strongly encourages greater transparency and accountability in all aspects of relations between the military and civil society. The use of security forces must not infringe on the public’s First Amendment rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of speech.  Respect for and protection of basic human rights is the only path to restoring much-needed trust in civil-military relations.

 

Contact:

Harvey Gavin

harvey.gavin@transparency.org.uk

+44 (0)20 3096 7695

+44 (0)79 6456 0340

Ara Marcen Naval is Head of Advocacy for Transparency International – Defence & Security. In this blog, she explains her motivations for joining the fight against corruption – and why our work in the defence sector matters more than ever.

 

In November 2019, I joined Transparency International’s Defence & Security Program after years working for other high-profile organisations on arms control and human rights.  Transparency International is best-known for its indices, especially the flagship Corruption Perception Index. But what most intrigued me were the less well known – but equally important – indices which measure the risk of corruption of the defence sector.

In my career, I have witnessed some of the biggest developments in the arms control regime, including the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty. However, despite civil society efforts to curb the arms trade, global defence spending keeps rising – by 15 per cent in the past decade. Major players like US, EU, China and Russia have embarked on major programmes to modernise and upgrade their militaries, increasing military spending over the decade to 2016 by 144 per cent and 106 per cent respectively. And many other states are following suit. In Asia, at least five countries have doubled their defence expenditure in the same period; in the Middle East, defence comprises an average 15 per cent of state spending.[1] The opportunity of trade deals hollows the considerations for development and human rights.

But it is not just the size of defence budgets that matters. Global military expenditure is rising, yet rising most rapidly in exactly those places where standards of governance are weakest. And where checks and balances are weak, vast proportions of public funding are spent in completely opaque ways.  Parliamentary committees, judiciaries, and audit offices are growing in authority in many countries from Malaysia, to South Africa, to Brazil. But defence matters all too often remain off-limits.

Despite this, the arms control regime (for instance, in the Arms Trade Treaty, or the EU Common position) does not observe corruption as one of the criteria to refuse the license to transfer weapons. Procurement and arms trade deals take place over time, sometimes there are deals that take 10 years or more, and currently there are no obligations for states to extant licences that can be suspended or revoked on the basis of new information or changed circumstances.

The arms industry is generally held to be among the most vulnerable to corrupt behaviour across all industrial and commercial sectors. Cases of large-scale corruption continue to be reported and recorded, and the problem is remarkably persistent despite repeated efforts to insert policies on anti-bribery and corruption. The excessive influence of the industry in government decisions has potentially dangerous consequences. It risks eroding the government’s ability to make independently informed choices on military needs, which might increasingly have to rely on data and expertise of existing suppliers with own vested interests when designing tenders, determining the merits of products and their suitability to close capability gaps.

The anti-corruption movement has a huge peak to climb. Defence & security sectors are excluded from most of the existing mechanisms to fight corruption as it lays in the national security arena. All states struggle with the need to find a balance between national security concerns and the freedom of information. The risks of failing to control sensitive information related to national security can be extremely serious, and it is understood that a higher level of secrecy is needed in areas of the defence and security sector to protect national security. However, this should not justify non-compliance with international best practices in secrecy classification.

Where there is no expectation that defence institutions are transparent about their activities, a multitude of opportunities for corruption present themselves. Weak legislation, a lack of accountability and poor or inexistent oversight systems provide the perfect environment for individuals to engage in corruption. We need to raise our voices to demand closer oversight: defence can’t continue being the exemption. It needs to be part of the anti-corruption efforts, both for civil society and for governments and institution.

 

[1] SIPRI, Military Expenditure Database 2017, https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex.

In 2016, Transparency International – Ukraine and Transparency International – Defence & Security created the Independent Defence Anti-Corruption Committee (NAKO). A year ago, NAKO became an independent NGO.

As NAKO moves through the transition toward effective governance and full operational autonomy, we  wish to thank all those who have contributed to its and our work so far. In particular, our thanks go to the NAKO Committee members: Drago Kos, Yulia Marushevska, Volodymyr Ogrysko, Oleh Rybachuk, James Wasserstrom and Michel Yakovleff, as well as previous Committee members – Timothy Evans and Sevgil Musaeva.

Director of Transparency International Defence and Security, Steve Francis, said:

“We thank the committee members for their insight and commitment. They have been key to the progress NAKO has made since it was set up three years ago in working towards building integrity, transparency and accountability in the defence sector in Ukraine.”

We look forward to continue working with NAKO as a strategic partner in Ukraine, and to support its efforts to combat corruption in the Ukrainian defence sector, thereby increasing the effectiveness of defence spending, improving living conditions of defence personnel and ensuring Ukraine’s defence forces provide state and human security.

7th March 2019, London – A resolution, passed in the Dutch Parliament, calling on the Dutch Government to support the inclusion of anti-corruption measures as a separate criterion in EU arms exports, is an important move that we hope will see further action, according to Transparency International Defence and Security Programme and Transparency International Netherlands.

On Tuesday, Dutch MPs voted to support a resolution that called for the strengthening of EU arms export criteria and noting that corruption occurs in major arms deals, contrary to both the law and the principle of fair competition.

The current EU Common Position on arms exports control, which dates from 2008, makes no reference to corruption in its 8 criteria, despite the very high risk of corruption in this sector. Introducing a corruption criterion would open the possibility of an export licence for military technology or equipment being denied where there is a clear risk that the deal might involve a significant level of corrupt practices. 

Steve Francis, Director of Transparency International Defence and Security said:

“We welcome this step by the Dutch Parliament as it calls the Government to take a leading role within the EU to carve out a new and explicit anti-corruption criterion in the EU’s arms export regime. We now hope the Dutch Government will use its influence in the European Council to push for the inclusion of this criterion as part of the Common Position review.”

“Big steps and strong leadership from member states is vital in tackling the risks posed to citizens, as well as the unfair playing field created by defence companies that engage in corrupt activity. We therefore hope other member states will adopt similar approaches to ensure anti-corruption provisions are properly considered ahead of arms deals.” 

***ENDS***

Contact:
Dominic Kavakeb
+44 20 3096 7695
+44 79 6456 0340
Dominic.kavakeb@transparency.org.uk

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