Category: Responsible Defence Governance

By Benedicte Aboul-Nasr, Project Officer, Transparency International – Defence & Security

On October 17, 2019, Lebanese citizens took to the streets in response to a government proposal to tax WhatsApp communications, in what would become known as the “Thawra”, or “Uprising” against widespread corruption and worsening economic conditions. A year after the beginning of the protests, and two months after the explosion in the Port of Beirut killed 191 people, injured over 6,500, and uprooted nearly 300,000, Lebanese citizens still have no clear answers as to why for six years, 2,700 tons of explosive chemicals were stored in hazardous conditions at the heart of Lebanon’s capital. Many suspect that a long history of negligence and corruption, the very factors that pushed people to the streets last year, are at least partly responsible for the devastation that took place on August 4, 2020.

The government response has been uneven and in the aftermath of the explosion authorities were slow to support immediate relief efforts. Instead, when Lebanese protesters took to the streets on August 8 to voice their anger towards a political class that many believe has benefited from Lebanese resources for decades, security forces responded harshly, deploying tear gas and live ammunition against protesters. Two days later, Hassan Diab’s government resigned, noting that corruption in Lebanon is “bigger than the state”. And, on August 13, eight days after the explosion, Parliament voted for a state of emergency, giving defence forces a broader mandate than the one they already had under the general mobilisation adopted to help contain COVID-19. Since then, Prime Minister-designate Mustapha Adib stepped down, within a month of his nomination, having failed to achieve the consensus necessary to form a government. At the time of writing, Lebanon remains in a political impasse, while former Prime Minister Hariri, who had stepped down two weeks into the protests in October 2019, is in the running to replace his successor.

Allegations of government corruption are not isolated incidents, and mismanagement has led to numerous crises and leadership vacuums over the years, which paved the way for the protest movement. Lebanon is now facing one of the most serious financial crises in its history which has crippled the economy. The state has defaulted on debt payments and banks are imposing de facto capital controls on withdrawals while Carnegie’s Middle East Center estimates that close to US$800 million were transferred out of the country within the first three weeks of the protests. The Lira lost 80% of its value over nine months; by July this year and Lebanon became the first country in the region to enter hyperinflation.  Even before the COVID-19 crisis hit, the World Bank had estimated that up to 45% of Lebanese citizens would be below the poverty line by the end of 2020. Despite undeniable evidence that the situation was untenable, prior to the explosion, discussions with the IMF had been stalled for months, and Alain Bifani, the finance ministry’s director-general, had resigned over state officials’ unwillingness to acknowledge the scale of the crisis and achieve consensus to identify solutions. The contract for a forensic audit of the Central Bank was only signed in August, and the audit itself did not begin until September.

The international community has offered loans and significant humanitarian aid to support victims and the reconstruction of Beirut. Tellingly, several governments have pledged that they would not disburse aid through the government, and are prioritising non-governmental organisations that have been at the forefront of assessment and reconstruction needs. Aid disbursed through the government, and renewed commitments to unlock funds promised by the CEDRE conference in 2018, are conditional on stringent anti-corruption reforms being adopted and must be accompanied by strict oversight. In this regard, it is crucial that Lebanese civil society and non-profit organisations are granted access to sufficient information to oversee the disbursement of aid and prevent funds from being lost.

As part of the broader powers and responsibilities granted to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) under the state of emergency proclaimed after the explosion, the military has been given the crucial role of coordinating the distribution of humanitarian aid and supporting other public bodies in their reconstruction efforts. In carrying out these roles, and with the additional powers from which they benefit, it is crucial that the LAF ensure the highest standards of integrity and transparency with the Lebanese public. The LAF has benefitted from a high level of trust in the past, and remains one of the most representative branches of government – the institution must ensure that it maintains trust and supports ways forward for the Lebanese, in particular as Lebanese citizens and organisations rebuild.

The coming months will be crucial for Beirut’s reconstruction and to help lift Lebanon out of the crisis it is experiencing. Anti-corruption measures and transparency, not only in the disbursement of aid but also in reform efforts, should be prioritised by the armed forces themselves, and more broadly by an incoming government committed to resolve the financial and political crises Lebanon currently faces as the country seeks international support. The Lebanese Transparency Association (LTA), Transparency International’s national chapter in Lebanon, has been advocating alongside Transparency International – Defence & Security for increased transparency and accountability of the defence sector since 2018. In 2020, LTA continued to emphasise the urgent need for further transparency with constituents, and for the armed forces to implement access to information legislation to allow Lebanese citizens to understand how the body functions. As the LAF maintain responsibility in the aftermath of the explosion, both for aid disbursement and for maintaining security alongside security forces, clear communications and oversight of the defence sector are critical.

The explosion and its aftermath have brought issues that Lebanese citizens were familiar with – and which pushed many to the streets over the last year – to the forefront of Lebanon’s dealings with the international community. Only by tackling the root causes, continuing to push for reform, and beginning to rebuild institutions in which the public can trust, will Lebanon have a chance to become more stable and pave a way out of the crisis. Lebanese politicians have often shown willingness to commit to reforms when dealing with the international community in the past. However; reforms have then stalled due to a lack of consensus, for instance leading to delays in implementing access to information legislation, or in selecting members for the National Anti-Corruption Commission. As the international community aims to support Lebanese citizens and help rebuild Beirut, they should be wary of attempts to divert assistance, and of mismanagement in the disbursement of funds. Instead, any international and national initiatives should support Lebanese citizens’ calls to dismantle the root causes of corruption, for the political class to seriously address the financial crisis, and for concrete and measurable steps for reform and accountability.

Benedicte Aboul-Nasr is Transparency International – Defence & Security’s Project Officer working on Conflict and Insecurity, with a focus on the MENA region. She has a background in international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians, and currently researches links between corruption and situations of crisis and conflict.

Governance reforms, including to security sector, are urgently needed

23 October 2020 – Transparency International condemns the Nigerian state’s excessive use of force and the continued perpetration of violence against peaceful protesters.

Protests that began with demands for an end to police brutality and the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), have since transformed into wider calls for an end to corruption and the looting of public funds. The government must respond to these calls with serious evidence-based anti-corruption reforms, including to the security sector, in dialogue with civil society.

Natalie Hogg, Director of Transparency International – Defence & Security, said: “The appalling violence we have seen against peaceful protestors has to end. The only way to restore the much-needed trust in relations between Nigerian citizens and the security sector is to respect and protect basic human rights. Further repressive actions against legitimate demands for an improved security sector in Nigeria will only escalate the situation.”

Nigeria’s score on the Government Defence Integrity Index by Transparency International – Defence & Security rates corruption risks in the country’s security sector as Very High, with extremely limited controls in operations and procurement. While oversight mechanisms are in place, they often lack coordination, expertise, resources, and adequate information to fully perform their role.

In addition, Nigeria has seen no significant improvement in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index since the current methodology was introduced in 2012. The 2019 Global Corruption Barometer for Africa found that Nigerians rate the police as the most corrupt institution in the country. Almost half of those surveyed reported paying a bribe to the police in the previous 12 months.

Delia Ferreira Rubio, Chair of Transparency International, said: “Corruption deprives ordinary people of their rights to peace, health, security and prosperity. It robs young people of a future in which they can fulfil their potential, and it misappropriates the wealth of a nation for the benefit of the few. Peaceful protesters exercising their right to freedom of assembly must never be met with violence and brutality. Citizens’ demands for an end to corruption must be heard and acted upon.”

Auwal Musa Rafsanjani, Executive Director of the Civil Society Legal Advocacy Centre (CISLAC), Transparency International’s national chapter in Nigeria, said: “The government of Nigeria must immediately stop deploying troops against protestors. The young people who have taken to the streets have a constitutional right to express their grievances through peaceful protest without facing violence and brutality from the state. Together with our civil society partners in Nigeria, we stand ready to work with the government on the root and branch reforms needed to the police and security agencies, and to stop the looting of public funds through corruption. We also condemn the violence and the destruction of property by groups that have infiltrated the peaceful protests.”

Despite promising initiatives, tackling corruption in the Nigerien security sector is still hindered by secrecy

By Flora Stevens, Project Officer – Global Advocacy

Africa’s Sahel has been plagued with conflict and insecurity for more than a decade, and the recent ramping up of violence in the region is putting already weakened armed forces under increased strain. Defence sectors across the region suffer from low levels of civilian democratic control, weak institutional oversight and are struggling to fulfil their mission to improve security in the face of a sharp uptick in attacks from non-state armed groups.

Sandwiched between jihadi militants operating in Mali and Burkina Faso to the west, Boko Haram and affiliated groups continuing to launch devastating attacks in Nigeria to the south and war-torn Libya to the north, Niger has found itself drawn into these conflicts. The complex operational requirements of bringing security to the country, with the huge distances between major settlements, porous borders and hundreds of thousands of displaced people, would pose a challenge for any armed force. But Niger, like its neighbours in the region, is also grappling with the debilitating issue of corruption in its defence sector.

Transparency International Niger has been part of the fight against corruption since 2001. The chapter works to raise public awareness of corruption issues and offers anti-corruption training to citizens. “This has enabled us to mobilise and engage citizens in the fight against corruption in our country,” said Hassane Amadou Diallo, head of the organisation. Transparency International Niger has recorded a series of major successes in its work, including a long-running advocacy campaign which culminated with Niger ratifying the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2006, and a separate effort to abolish the ‘entrance exam’ to the civil service, a highly competitive processes which on two occasions was marred by fraud and corruption.

More recently, working with Transparency International – Defence & Security, the chapter has been involved in tackling the pernicious issue of defence corruption. Despite recent promising initiatives at national level, efforts designed to fight corruption and improve defence governance have been hindered by a high level of secrecy. It was recently revealed that almost 40% of the $312 million Niger spent on defence procurement contracts over the last three years was lost through inflated costs or materiel that was not delivered, according to a government audit of military contracts. “More than 90% of the contracts awarded to the Ministry of Defence were negotiated by direct agreement, which favoured corruptive practices and overbilling”, said Hassane Amadou. “The competition is unfair, fictitious and sometimes non-existent.” These findings came as the crisis in the Sahel continues to worsen, with hundreds of Nigerien security forces killed in fighting. At the same time, troops on the front line have complained about a lack of kit or being provided with inadequate equipment. Hassane Amadou said the audit that uncovered the extent of the procurement mismanagement would now be subject to a lengthy legal challenge. “TI Niger is hoping a fair trial will take place and that those responsible will be punished in accordance with the law,” he said.

While the findings of the audit are shocking, they unfortunately do not come as a surprise. Transparency International – Defence and Security’s Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) recently found that while government procurement regulations are clearly spelled out in law, there is a long-standing exemption for defence procurement. The 2016 Code of Public Procurements omits goods, equipment, supplies and services related to defence and security, which effectively leaves the door open to the sort of corrupt practices uncovered by the audit.

Hassane Amadou said that TI Niger has shared the main conclusions of the GDI findings with those in charge of the defence and security forces in the country. “On the basis of the GDI, we then developed an action plan targeting various stakeholders, namely the Ministry of Defence, the parliament, defence and security officials, technical and financial partners, the media and civil society,” he said.

But while there have been signs that Niger is striving to improve its security sector governance as a key pillar for future development and long-term peace and stability, the lack of emphasis on the issue of corruption could critically undermine the effectiveness and sustainability of the whole process.

Despite the impressive reform efforts of the past few years, including the 2016-2021 Renaissance Programme, the 2016 Anti-Corruption Bill, and the 2018 National Strategy to Fight Corruption, Niger is struggling to ensure their effective implementation. The Nigerien government should primarily focus on closing this gap and on rectifying loopholes that allow for corruption in the defence procurement sector to thrive. This could include revising relevant legislation to ensure it effectively applies to all defence acquisitions, with no exceptions.

It is fundamental for the Nigerien military to fully grasp the intrinsic link between corruption and operational efficiency. An important focus area must be the deployment of trained professionals to monitor corruption risks in the field. There is unfortunately currently little evidence of this. There is no pre-deployment corruption-specific training for personnel and no guidelines on addressing corruption risks during operations.

To tackle the security threats Niger is facing, mitigating corruption risks in the defence sector is paramount and requires a robust, disciplined and integrated approach on the part of the Niger government. It needs to ensure civilian oversight is strengthened through well-functioning oversight mechanisms, while making sure corruption is approached in a systemic or comprehensive manner during troop deployment.

With security threatened by increasingly belligerent armed actors and a hastened drawdown of international troops due to COVID-19, Iraq cannot afford to leave its defence institutions open to corruption.

By Benedicte Aboul-Nasr

Since October 2019, Iraq has seen tensions in its political sphere, including public protests, declining oil prices, increasing risks of proxy war between the US and Iran, and the resurgence of violent armed groups; the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated an already precarious security situation. After six months without a government, Iraq’s parliament appointed Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi in May 2020, and granted his full cabinet confidence in June. To respond to the state’s most urgent priorities, the incoming government and its international partners should urgently consider addressing risks of corruption and human rights violations, in particular in the defence sector, to guarantee that the defence forces have the capacity, resources, and popular backing, to respond to priorities.

In research published this week, Transparency International – Defence & Security has found Iraq’s defence sector to be at critical risk of corruption, and lacking anti-corruption and transparency mechanisms. In fact, our Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) indicates that Iraq is particularly vulnerable to risks relating to finances and personnel, and does not fare much better in the areas of political, operational, and procurement corruption risks, with an overall score of 9/100 on the Index. Corruption has been linked to the erosion of institutions and of trust, and is one of the main grievances driving the protests that broke out last October. As critical as these results are, they offer the new government a blank slate to meaningfully reform the defence sector from the ground up; this will be imperative to secure longer-term security for the country.

COVID-19 has added another threat; the crisis has severely affected Iraqi citizens, as security forces enforce curfews against a backdrop of unrest and accusations of forces deliberately firing on protesters, killing over 600, injuring thousands, and recent reports of ill-treatment and torture of anti-government protesters. It is also likely to disproportionately affect displaced populations, more vulnerable to the pandemic following years of conflict and displacement, with more poorly resourced accommodation, protection, and health systems. Crucially, the pandemic has also generated additional security challenges, as the government and defence institutions redirect resources towards its pandemic response, while simultaneously countering the apparent resurgence of extremist groups. Indeed, Iraq is already facing the resurgence of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which are seeking to exploit the governance vacuum and the pandemic to resurface.

Governments around the globe have rapidly shifted their own priorities in response to COVID-19. Within weeks of the outbreak, France, Canada, the United States and several European countries in the global coalition against ISIL announced temporary withdrawals of their troops from Iraq and from NATO Mission – Iraq. Meanwhile, Operation Inherent Resolve announced that it had stopped training Iraqi security forces, as the Iraqi military also suspended its trainings to reduce the spread of the virus. Against this backdrop, ISIL has actively called for its members to ‘act’, encouraging supporters to ‘exploit disorder’ and is increasing the pace and violence of attacks, taking advantage of the drawdown of international troops.

Countering corruption risks in defence must therefore become a priority. Doing so would limit the risks of abuses of civilian populations, illegal trade of cultural property, of theft or diversion of already limited resources, and would ensure that Iraq’s defence institutions can respond to the multiple challenges it faces. Iraq has seen the consequences of a poorly governed and corrupt defence sector: the military cannot afford vulnerabilities akin to those that enabled the rise of ISIL in 2014. At the time, corruption fuelled problems which left troops hollowed out and outnumbered, such as equipment theft and ‘ghost soldiers’ – members of the military whose names were registered and salaries disbursed, without being present in military ranks. ISIL actively used these issues as recruitment tools in its propaganda, and militants developed government functions in areas where relations with government had deteriorated for years. The group benefitted more concretely from the erosion of security services, where corruption had thrived, to take over swathes of territory, leading to the prolongation of the conflict. Despite the military defeat of the group in 2018, these vulnerabilities remain and risk weakening the Iraqi armed forces when they are most needed.

Iraq’s defence institutions and oversight are severely lacking, and do not fulfil basic requirements of anti-corruption and transparency. Yet they can no longer afford a weak stance on corruption, nor on human rights. To avoid exploitation of existing vulnerabilities and erosion of the defence and security forces similar to those that led to Mosul’s fall in 2014, the government must turn its attention to defence governance, and tackle existing vulnerabilities such as those highlighted by the GDI. The incoming government is in a unique position to do so, and has already pledged to investigate the allegations of torture disclosed by the UN. The government could also take concrete steps and measures to strengthen integrity and accountability within the armed forces. In addition, both the new Defence Minister, Juma Inad, and Interior Minister, Osman Ghanimi, have extensive and highly respected military backgrounds and an in depth understanding of Iraq’s security challenges which could support reform of the defence and security sectors.

International partners have a critical role to play and should actively promote instilling anti-corruption systems into longer-term institution building and reconstruction efforts. For instance, international partners should prioritise including anti-corruption and integrity building within training courses and partnerships with the armed forces. They could also, as a means of supporting longer term development of defence institutions, support the development of accountability structures, such as streamlining a code of conduct for all military forces, developing and implementing mechanisms to allow whistle-blowing and whistle-blower protections within the armed forces, and setting up clear systems for investigations of allegations of abuse.

Armed groups in the country and its neighbourhood are becoming more belligerent, taking advantage of the pandemic and withdrawal of international forces. In this context, weeding out corruption in institutions, and strengthening anti-corruption mechanisms in the longer term, will be essential for Iraq’s government to begin restoring trust, and for armed forces to effectively respond to security threats and the resurgence of non-state belligerents.

Benedicte Aboul-Nasr is a Project Officer at Transparency International – Defence & Security. Her areas of focus are the MENA region, and how corruption affects conflict and security in the region.

This article originally appeared on the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) website.

By Ara Marcen Naval and Karolina MacLachlan.

Throughout the coronavirus outbreak, all eyes have been on the sector providing the frontline response to the epidemic: healthcare. But as the military steps in to assist in a growing number of countries around the world, there are questions about whether that could lead to additional problems.

The military capacity for rapid, large-scale movements – whether to protect hospitals, distribute supplies or increase transport capabilities – can be essential in responding to an infectious disease outbreak. Large-scale military deployments are likely to have the biggest impact in countries with weak healthcare systems and governance, limited civilian response capacities, vastly dispersed populations, or ongoing conflict and insecurity.

As low-income countries brace for the onset of the coronavirus pandemic and health authorities warn of challenges ahead, it is important to remember that large-scale military operations in support of the response to coronavirus in fragile and conflict states carry significant risks. Political, financial and health crises often expose cracks in the system that are less noticeable in more settled times. For instance, long-term governance gaps and ongoing corruption in armed forces can undermine civilian trust, making their work during crises more difficult. Military deployments during the Ebola outbreaks in the DRC and Liberia in 2014 and 2019 are examples of the role armed forces can play in limiting the scale of an epidemic – yet groups such as Médecins Sans Frontières also argued that years of abuse at the hands of the DRC’s military had made the local population wary of these troops, undermining their efforts.

Transparency International’s Defence and Security research shows that in many developing and fragile states, defence sectors tend to be poorly governed. High levels of secrecy and dysfunctional oversight structures often enable fraud, corruption and a wide range of abuses. The coronavirus crisis, like others before, has the potential to exacerbate these vulnerabilities, weakening militaries when they are needed most.

For example, where frontline soldiers go unpaid or have their salaries stolen by senior officers – a problem which research indicates affects the DRC, Iraq, Mali and Nigeria – militaries could see ill-disciplined units prone to avoiding service, busy trying to secure other sources of income or abusing civilians. A health and humanitarian emergency, which puts frontline responders at additional risk, could prove too much for those troops to handle, while sudden access to scarce resources could provide opportunities at the expense of the civilian population. Where militaries are already affected by corrupt practices, acceptance of small bribes and other favours can undermine containment efforts. Simultaneously, favouritism or corrupt networks could skew distribution of healthcare equipment by influencing the choice of priorities. Disciplinary issues, usually more widespread in states with weaker overall defence governance, could make an appearance or be exacerbated by the crisis. In the Philippines, for instance, President Duterte has already given police and military officials the order to shoot ‘troublemakers’.

Finally, a health and humanitarian crisis could see deployments of foreign troops into fragile and conflict states. As the Ebola example suggests, sizable deployments of US and UK forces into Liberia and the DRC helped construct and protect health facilities, distribute supplies and train healthcare workers. However, as international forces intervene in crises, the tangible and intangible resources they bring ­– such as cash, necessary items and political support for local actors – could further strengthen corrupt networks, as has been seen in countries such as Afghanistan. As Transparency International’s guidance on military interventions indicates, international forces themselves are also not immune to corruption, exacerbating challenges already in existence.

As economies weakened by coronavirus will require additional investment to rebuild, countries cannot allow uncontrolled resource outflows through defence and security institutions. Governments should take measures to strengthen defence governance immediately, offering a maximum level of protection in the short term and strengthening the global response. The authors recommend, for instance:

Inserting anti-corruption measures and the highest levels of transparency at the core of any new legislation (including that governing the distribution of resources) to respond to the emergency. This should include making publicly accessible contracts that govern financial flows and procurement associated with the crisis.
Ensuring that military deployments to help manage the emergency have clear timelines, independent oversight and are subject to review and audit mechanisms.
Extending protection to whistleblowers to help ensure that those who see corruption, whether in healthcare or in defence, can safely report it.
In the longer term and as the crisis recedes, it is key that attention to oversight and control of the defence sector becomes a priority, especially in fragile and conflict-affected states. Defence, healthcare and development are not mutually exclusive; slippage in one is likely to endanger progress in the other. Without fixing defence, sustainable development and better healthcare are unlikely to take root, especially in the most vulnerable countries.

Ara Marcen Naval is the Head of Advocacy for Transparency International – Defence & Security.

Karolina MacLachlan is Transparency International – Defence & Security’s Regional Programme Manager for Europe.

The theme of this year’s annual Munich Security Conference was ‘Westlessness’.  Awkward to pronounce and going by the evidence, equally awkward to discuss in (polite) internationally mixed company.  That those countries self-identifying as ‘Western’, are having a moment of self-doubt is not in dispute.  But as the US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo was at pains to stress during his speech to the conference, the list of the West’s competitive advantages is as long as it is impressive.  Despite that, somehow the doubts remain.  There is no shortage of books, journal articles and editorials attempting to explain why the assumptions that have dominated global discourse and conduct on security and defence for the past 70 years are now under siege.  Aside from concerns over the US’s continued commitment to fortify the West’s key brands like NATO, the other most often cited evidence for Westlessness was the sense that the international rules based order too is no longer the default standard it once was.

For some, including the authors of the Conference’s report and leaders such as France’s President Macron, the answer lies in finding – and presumably before that, agreeing to – a joint plan for action.  For Macron, this would come from the European Union.  Others continue to look to the US in the hope that at some point, and maybe as early as November, signs will emerge that normal business will soon be resumed.  Nonetheless, some things once said cannot be unsaid, and now that the genie of self-doubt is out the bottle, and has been named, any re-set will require sustained stewardship and patient hard work by all those with an interest in maintaining the West’s values and its underpinning ideals.

So what might be done while the West waits for the emergence of a plan, be that joint, US led, EU led or otherwise?  Are there parallels with other governance reform efforts that seek to help institutions that have lost their way?  For some fifteen years, Transparency International’s Defence and Security programme (TI-DS) has been working tirelessly to raise awareness of the corrosive effects of corruption in the global defence sector. Challenging the view that corruption is merely an economic or financial cost, its work continues to show that once a more rounded interpretation of corruption is combined with a sector specific approach and a deeper appreciation of its precursors, patterns are revealed and wider implications become better understood.  TI-DS work indicates how the onset of institutional malaise can help create the conditions for corruption to take root in a sector, while also pointing to decay in the broader governance of the political system of which it is a part.  Running in parallel, is corruption’s relationship with the breakdown of trust between the public and those they fund (through their taxes) to protect them, undermining confidence in the State and if left unchecked, how it can lead to instability, insecurity and ultimately to conflict.

This is not to say, that what lies at the heart of the West’s strategic drift is corruption.  The temptations that can lead to corrupt behaviour, in all its guises, can and do exist in the most transparent and accountable of systems, and the bastions of the West’s defence are no less immune to it than others.  Rather, that the common thread that connects the two is ‘complacency’.  It is complacency that starts the erosion of oversight mechanisms and institutional safeguards. The difficult and often mundane work that politicians, military leaders and bureaucracies are required to do to tend and maintain the complex web of checks, balances, customs and practices, needs constant attention and insistent reaffirmation. The problem for the generation that inherits a system, as opposed to generation that built and in some cases fought for it, is that the prevailing conditions are seen as a given, somehow self-governing and possibly even inevitable.  And what might be true for institutions that govern national defense and security, can also true for a wider political system and by extension, a broader international system, especially one built on rarely explained shared values and inherited assumptions.  In the absence of a conscious effort to maintain its safeguards, it is perhaps inevitable that cracks will appear that can be exploited by those motivated to take advantage of perceived weakness or discord.

For Transparency International Defence and Security, the first step in any successful institutional reform programme is the identification of reform-minded leaders willing to take on the challenge of re-instilling the confidence in the organisations they lead.  In turn, those that are led need to believe that’s their leaders understand the problem and mean to do what it takes to mend it.  But this leadership must come from within the institution; be that a single branch of the military, a ministry, or within a government.  Rarely, does it come from outside.  In the same way, calls by Western leaders for joint action, or US leadership, overlook important options much closer to home.  The complacency that crept up on the West after the fall of the Berlin Wall arguably took hold because collectively, the West took its values, its justifications and its popularity for granted.  Moreover, they believed that liberal democracy’s victory in the Cold War, had proven that it was inevitable; and as such it didn’t need to be explained, justified or renewed.

The first step in redressing the West’s moment of self-doubt therefore, like the first step in tackling corruption within an institution, is to recognise that reform starts when its leaders re-build and re-assert the case for shared values with its disillusioned rank and file, and begin the process of reconnecting with sceptical populations. Reform and renewal isn’t easy at any level, but it is best led by those closest to the problem.  Waiting for the leadership of others, or a proposal for a joint action, will only allow the doubt to linger and unpalatable alternatives to gain greater currency and increase their traction. If and when joint action or the leadership of others is eventually offered, those that have already started to tackle to problem at source, will always be better placed to contribute

By Matthew Steadman, Project Officer – Conflict & Insecurity

2019 was a deeply concerning year for the Sahel. Attacks by extremist groups have increased five-fold in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso since 2016, with the UN now describing the violence as “unprecedented”. The past year was the deadliest by far with more than 4,000 deaths reported. Niger lost 89 soldiers in a single attack by Islamic State in Changodar in January, whilst two ISGS attacks in Mali in November claimed the lives of 92 soldiers. In Burkina Faso alone, 1,800 people were killed in the past year due to extremist violence. The intensification of extremist activity in the Sahel threatens to engulf West African coastal states, as already weakened national defence and security forces come under increasing pressure. Much international coverage of the developing events has focussed on the operational aspect of the crisis, from the various armed groups operating in the region to the international response, spearheaded by France’s Operation BARKHANE but also including MINUSMA, the G5 Sahel, the United States and the EU. However, one aspect that has been regularly overlooked is the poor capacity of the region’s national defence forces to respond to security threats as a result of poor defence governance, corruption and weak institutions.

Corruption and conflict go hand in hand, with corruption often fuelling violence and subsequently flourishing in afflicted regions. Because of corruption and poor governance, defence and security actors are often seen not as legitimate providers of security, but as net contributors to the dynamics of conflict; with poor training, management and institutional support leading to a downward cycle in which it is the civilians that more than often feel the brunt – as has been seen in Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Mali. When security institutions are perceived as corrupt, public confidence in government erodes further. Fragile governments that are unable to respond to the needs of citizens can exacerbate existing grievances, heightening social tensions and hastening the onset of violence. Across the Sahel, armed groups have been able to entrench themselves first and foremost in those areas which have been neglected by weakened and corrupt central authorities, often by positioning themselves as providers of security, justice and basic services. In this way, it is crucial to view corruption not just as the consequence of conflict, but more often as its root cause and therefore a critical element for any attempt at resolution to address.

Against this backdrop, research by Transparency International – Defence & Security’s Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI), highlights the deficiencies in the safeguards which should provide protection against corruption in the defence sectors of Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Niger and Nigeria, increasing the likelihood of defence funds and capabilities being wasted due to mismanagement of human, material and financial resources. In doing so, the GDI outlines a number of key issues which need to be addressed in order to enhance security forces’ ability to respond to threats and protect local communities:

Reinforce parliamentary oversight

Despite most countries having formal independent oversight mechanisms for defence activities, policies and procurement, our research has found that these are often only partially implemented, easily circumvented and insufficiently resourced to carry out their mandates. The result, is defence sectors which are still largely the preserve of the ruling elite and shrouded in secrecy, raising concerns over the use of vital defence funds and the management of resources and assets.

Strengthen anti-corruption measures in personnel management and military operations

Personnel management systems are also vulnerable, with inadequate or non-existent whistleblowing protections and reporting mechanisms, unclear appointment, and promotion systems open to nepotism, and codes of conduct which fail to specifically mention corruption or enforce appropriate sanctions. Equally, despite many countries in the region being actively engaged in on-going counter insurgencies, there is no evidence of Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso or Nigeria having up to date doctrine which recognises corruption as a strategic threat to operations, meaning there is little if any appropriate training on the pitfalls associated with operating in corrupt environments and little appreciation of how soldiers’ conduct might exacerbate the violence they are trying to quell.

Increase transparency and external oversight of procurement processes

Perhaps most concerning of all is that corruption risks in defence procurement remain extremely high across the region. The procurement process is opaque and largely exempt from the checks and balances which regulate other areas of public procurement in countries like Mali and Niger for instance. Across the region, the effectiveness of audit and control mechanisms over the acquisition of military goods and services is heavily restricted by blanket secrecy clauses and over-classification of defence expenditure. This raises serious concerns over the utility, relevance and value for money of purchased equipment and increases the risk of that frontline troops will not have the resources required to deliver security.

Despite these structural vulnerabilities, international assistance in the region has been heavily focussed on security assistance rather than on improving the underlying structures that govern and manage defence and security in the states that make up the region. The 13^th January summit between French President Emmanuel Macron and the leaders of the G5 Sahel countries, was emblematic of this with the meeting focussed on reaffirming France’s military presence in the region and announcing the deployment of further troops, whilst side-lining the governance deficit which underlies so much of the crisis. Programmes have tended to focus on training and equipping military and police forces in Mali and Burkina Faso for instance, or improving strike capabilities by investing in US drone bases in Niger. The concern however, is that the impact of these efforts will be blunted without a more sustained engagement in addressing the more fundamental failings that lay at the hearty of the problem. Mali’s recent announcement of a recruitment drive for 10,000 new defence and security forces personnel for example, will only be effective if it is accompanied with improvements in the way these troops are trained, led, equipped and managed and if the political and financial processes which govern them are strengthened and corruption risks reduced.

A successful response, at the national, regional and international levels, to the violence cannot be just security focussed. Poor defence governance and corruption risks will continue to hamper national forces’ operations and will hinder the impact of international efforts which support them. A more comprehensive approach is needed which addresses the underlying corruption risks which permeate the region’s defence sectors.  Improving oversight, transparency and accountability is a critical step in securing a sustainable peace in the region and ensuring that defence and security apparatuses do what they should, which is to further the human security of populations that they should be serving.

January 14, 2020 – Sweeping reforms to controls on American arms sales abroad are increasing holes in checks to identify and curb corruption – measures that can also be used to assess whether sales may help or hurt efforts to address terrorist threats and attacks – according to new research by Transparency International Defense & Security.

Launched today, Holes in the Net assesses the current state of US arms export controls by examining corruption risk in three of the most prominent sales programs, which together authorized at least $125 billion in arms sales worldwide for fiscal year 2018.

Across all three different arms sales programs, which are managed by the Defense, State, and Commerce Departments, there is a clear gap in American efforts to assess critical, known corruption risk factors. This include the risks of corrupt practices – such as theft of defense resources, bribery, and promoting military leaders based on loyalty instead of merit – weakening partner military forces.

The United States is one of the biggest arms exporters to countries identified as facing ‘critical’ corruption risk in their defense sector, including Egypt, Jordan, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, according to recent analysis by Transparency International – Defense & Security.

Steve Francis OBE, Director of Transparency International – Defense & Security, said:

“Given the corrosive effect corruption has on military effectiveness and legitimacy, it is deeply concerning to see that these reforms to American arms export controls have made it easier for practices like bribery and embezzlement to thrive.  In order to ensure American arms sales do not fuel corruption in countries like Egypt, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, it is imperative to understand and mitigate the corruption risks associated with countries receiving US-made weapons before approving major arms deals.”

Of the three programs assessed in the report – Foreign Military Sale, Direct Commercial Sale, and the 600 Series – the 600 Series was identified as having the biggest gaps in its anti-corruption measures. Overseen by the Commerce Department, sales through this program do not require declarations on a series of major corruption risk areas, including on certain arms agents or brokers, political contributions, company subsidiaries and affiliates, and any defense offsets. These areas are common conduits used for bribery and political patronage.

More recently, the Trump administration has proposed moving many types of semi-automatic firearms and sniper rifles to Commerce Department oversight. The proposal calls for additional controls for firearms, but also reduces overall oversight of small and light weapons exports.

 Colby Goodman, Transparency International – Defense & Security consultant and author of the report, said:

“Over the past 30 years, America has established some of the strongest laws to prevent bribery and fraud by defense companies engaged in arms sales. However, defense companies selling arms through the 600 Series program no longer have to comply with key anti-corruption requirements. As a result, US officials will likely find it harder to identify and curb bribery and fraud in sales of arms overseen by the Commerce Department.”

The report analyzed five priority corruption risk factors for American arms sales programs: 1) Ill-defined and unlikely military justification; 2) Undisclosed or unfair promotions and salaries in recipient countries; 3) Under-scrutinized and illegitimate agents, brokers and consultants; 4) Ill-monitored and under-publicized defense offset contracts, and 5) Undisclosed, mismatched or secretive payments.

The report makes a series of policy recommendations that would help strengthen anti-corruption measures in these prominent arms sale programs, including:

• Creating a corruption risk framework for assessing arms sales through programs managed by the Defense, State, and Commerce Departments. These assessment frameworks must examine key risk factors identified in our report, including theft of defense resources and promoting military leaders based on loyalty instead of merits, among others.
• Strengthening defense company declarations and compliance systems for sales of arms overseen by the Commerce Department, including declarations of any defense company political contributions, marketing fees, commissions, defense offsets, and financiers and insurance brokers of arms – all clear conduits for corruption.
• Increasing transparency on arms sales and actions to combat arms trafficking overseen by the Defense, State, and Commerce Department. Critically, the Defense and State Departments need more details on defense offsets in order to properly review proposed arms sales. There is virtually no information on Commerce Department approved arms sales.
• Legislation requiring for firearms and associated munitions to remain categorized as munitions to ensure further relaxing of export controls do not adversely impact US national security or foreign policy objectives.

Notes to editors:

Interviews are available with the report author.

Holes in the Net is available to download here.

Saudi Arabia, a major importer of US-made arms, failed to defend against an attack on its oil facilities in September 2019. Reports have suggested that corrupt ‘coup-proofing’ measures designed to shield the ruling family likely contributed to the ineffective response.

Contact:

Harvey Gavin

harvey.gavin@transparency.org.uk

+44 (0)20 3096 7695

+44 (0)79 6456 0340

By Steve Francis OBE, Director of Transparency International – Defence & Security

The Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) is the first global analysis of corruption risks and the existence and enforcement of controls to manage that vulnerability in defence and security institutions, highlighting priority areas for improvement. Key to analysing results from the Index is understanding that the GDI measures corruption risk, not levels of corruption per se.

GDI data will be released in regional waves through 2020. Results from the most recent wave – the Middle East and North Africa – were published in November.

On the whole, the data paints a fairly bleak picture for the region. Tunisia leads the group with an overall grade of “D,” indicating a “high” degree of defence corruption risk, while the other 11 assessed countries received either an “E” or an “F” – signalling “very high” or “critical” levels of risk. Regional averages reflect a similar performance across the individual risk areas – political, financial, personnel, operations, and procurement.

With these findings in mind, what can the analysis of the GDI’s result teach us about protracted cases of armed conflict, political instability, and insecurity that seem to characterise the region?

1. In many cases, high defence corruption risk is symptomatic of wider governance issues.

The GDI’s political risk indicators and aggregated scores on anti-corruption themes examine broader issues of legislative oversight, public debate, access to budgetary information, and civil society activity – issues that don’t just impact the defence sector. Indeed, this area of the assessment highlights essential ingredients for any open and transparent government that engages constructively with its citizens. As most of the assessed MENA countries are governed by authoritarian regimes, we should not be too surprised then that these wider governance challenges also exist in the defence sector. Specifically, our data found a clear lack of external oversight, audit mechanisms, and scrutiny of defence institutions across the region.

Table: MENA region average scores for key political risk indicators and anti-corruption themes

2. Countries with the highest defence corruption risk are also significant arms importers.

Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Algeria were three of the world’s top five arms importers from 2014-2018. All three received an “F” grade in the GDI, with Egypt and Algeria receiving the bottom two regional scores (6/100 and 8/100, respectively).

The region has gaps in export controls, with only Lebanon and Palestine having ratified the Arms Trade Treaty, in addition to related risks like a lack of regulation around lobbying in defence and virtually no transparency around defence spending.

Although major arms exporters to the region like the United States have rules against the transfer of arms to third parties, end-use monitoring is not always consistent or comprehensive. This is especially troubling given that top arms importers in the region are either directly involved in or are arming parties to the devastating conflicts in both Yemen and Libya.

3. Low-scoring countries also exhibit high corruption risk by blurring the line between business and defence.

While the region as a whole scored poorly on indicators relating to the beneficial ownership (47/100) and scrutiny of military-owned businesses (44/100), these risks are greatest in countries with extensive military-run industries and/or significant natural resources. In Egypt for example, the military owns lucrative businesses across industries ranging from food and agriculture to mining, but has few controls in place for regulating these ventures. In Algeria, a largely state-owned economy renowned for high levels of corruption and patronage, there are a range of potential implications now that the military has stepped in to fill the vacuum following the ousting of President Bouteflika in March 2019 following mass public unrest.

The Gulf monarchies offer an example of how defence and business can overlap at the level of the individual. In the assessment for Saudi Arabia, we found that members of the royal family who serve in senior military positions also have controlling or financial interests in businesses related to the country’s petroleum sector. In the UAE as well, our research found that Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, is also the Chairman of a company dealing in natural resources.

On the other end of the spectrum, the GDI found that in Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia, defence and security institutions do not own businesses of any significant scale, thereby removing a significant source of corruption risk.

As the GDI data shows, the risk of defence corruption in the MENA region is a serious concern with the potential to exacerbate ongoing conflict and instability. However, robust tools like the GDI can help governments to identify gaps in safeguarding practices – the first step in a process towards reform – while supporting civil society and oversight actors in countries across the region in conducting evidence-based advocacy.

6 December, Niamey – Security and stability in Niger are threatened by high levels of corruption risk in its national defence sector, according to new research by Transparency International – Defence & Security.

Niger’s defence sector scores poorly in the 2020 Government Defence Integrity Index, which is today being launched in Niamey. Receiving a majority of E and F grades, indicating either a “very high” or “critical” risk of defence corruption, the analysis assesses corruption risk across five key areas: political, financial, operations, personnel and procurement.

But Niger’s overall score of 22/100 places it above the regional average of 18/100, with levels of corruption risk in the country’s political, financial and procurement categories lower than in the region, but higher in terms of personnel and operations.

Steve Francis, OBE, Director of Transparency International – Defence & Security, said:

“In recent years, Niger has become increasingly affected by the conflict and insecurity in neighbouring Mali, which has quickly spread across the Sahel. With Niger now a key member of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, contributing over a thousand troops to the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali and receiving increasing amounts of military and technical assistance from foreign donors, the country is on the frontline of the regional struggle against extremist groups.

“Given the empirical link between corruption and conflict and the corrosive effect of corruption on defence capabilities, it is essential for Niger to accelerate its efforts to improve the governance of the defence sector and strengthen civilian democratic oversight of the defence apparatus. We urge the Nigerien government to improve the access to defence information of legislative and oversight bodies and take steps towards improving transparency and external oversight in procurement processes. Building the integrity and effectiveness of Niger’s defence sector will enhance its ability to respond to multiplying regional security threats and bolster public trust in defence and security institutions.

“With high corruption risks across national defence sectors in West Africa, tools like our Government Defence Integrity Index are more important than ever. By highlighting areas where safeguards against corruption are weak or non-existent, campaigners on the ground and reform minded military leaders and politicians can use these results to push for real change. Taking action to improve transparency and closing the loopholes which allow corruption to thrive is a critical step in building effective and accountable defence and security forces.”

 

These findings come against a backdrop of rising insecurity in Niger and the Sahel more broadly. Attacks by extremist groups against civilians and Nigerien defence and security forces are rising, while the protracted conflicts in Mali and Libya are increasingly spilling across the border into Niger. Mounting instability in Burkina Faso, Northern Nigeria and the Lake Chad region are also threatening to seriously impact the security of populations along Niger’s southern border and are turning the landlocked nation into a critical base in the fight against violent extremism.

Despite recent promising government initiatives and reforms, attempts to improve defence governance in Niger are hindered by high levels of secrecy and defence exceptionalism, which severely limit oversight and control of defence institutions by parliament and audit mechanisms.

The capacity of the National Assembly to hold the government to account is hampered by a lack of technical expertise and limited access to information, whilst a general lack of engagement between the defence establishment and civil society further limits the scope of civilian democratic oversight.

Financial oversight is also curtailed by the lack of a detailed defence budget made available to the legislature. Even the parliamentary Defence and Security Commission is presented with only abbreviated information when it comes to spending on secret items and military intelligence, whilst audit mechanisms are limited in terms of capacity and access to information. This lack of oversight is mirrored in Niger’s defence procurement process, with many purchases excluded from normal public procurement procedures. Moreover, reports from the Inspector General, along with the military acquisition plan are strictly confidential, thereby hugely hindering external control.

Personnel management would be improved through a greater emphasis on addressing corruption, for instance through revamped Codes of Conduct and specific anti-corruption training which are currently lacking. Equally, the nomination and recruitment processes at higher levels are shrouded in secrecy, opening the door for nepotistic practices.

Finally, Niger’s defence sector scores very poorly in terms of operational risk, with its military doctrine lacking an appreciation of corruption as a strategic threat during deployments.

At a time of growing regional instability, Transparency International – Defence & Security urges the Nigerien government to consider heightening efforts to improve civilian democratic oversight of the defence sector and strengthening the integrity of the armed forces to better respond to the security threats with which it is faced.

Notes to editors:

The full, country-specific Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) results for Niger and West Africa as a whole are available at https://ti-defence.org/gdi/

The GDI assesses the existence, effectiveness and enforcement of institutional and informal controls to manage the risk of corruption in defence and security institutions.

Our team of experts draws together evidence from a wide variety of sources and interviewees across 77 indicators to provide a detailed assessment of the integrity of national defence institutions, and awards a score for each country from A to F.

The GDI was previously known as the Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index (GI). The Index underwent a major update for the 2020 version, including changes to the methodology and scoring underpinning the project. This means overall country scores from this 2020 version cannot be accurately compared with country scores from previous iterations of the Index.

Subsequent GDI results will be released in 2020, covering Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America, G-20 countries, the Asia Pacific region, East and Southern Africa, and NATO+.

Contact:

Harvey Gavin

harvey.gavin@transparency.org.uk

+44 (0)20 3096 7695

++44 (0)79 6456 0340

By Stephanie Trapnell, Head of Research, and Michael Ofori-Mensah PhD, Project Manager

How to govern military power presents one of the great global challenges of our age. Powerful, secretive and responsible for the world’s most destructive capabilities, when the governance of defence fails, it fails spectacularly, often leading to conflict and further instability. And yet many national defence sectors lack the basic governance standards of other public sectors. Reform programmes are difficult to steward through to success, but the rewards of doing so can improve military effectiveness and help reconnect armed forces with the societies they serve.

To aid this process, Transparency International has developed the evidence-based Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI). It is the first global analysis of corruption risks and the existence and enforcement of controls to manage that vulnerability in defence and security institutions, highlighting priority areas for improvement.

The 2020 iteration of the GDI focuses on 89 countries, selected based on the following criteria:

• their significant and/or high-profile roles in the global arms trade
• being at risk for political or defence-related instability
• undergoing reforms that were expected to result in changed circumstances for defence integrity.

As such, it has a crucial role to play in driving global defence reform. The GDI is designed to be a tool for governments seeking to improve their integrity protocols and a platform to share best practice with civil society, international organisations, the media and country investors, identifying where they need to push for change in the sector.

Overall, our experience to date shows that where governments have used the GDI as a roadmap for reforms, it can make a strong contribution to bringing about positive changes and mitigate the risks corrupt practices can pose to a state’s legitimacy and ability to respond to threats.

What does the GDI measure?

The GDI measures corruption risk, not levels of corruption per se. It assesses that risk in the entire defence and security sector within a country, which involves evaluating the factors that facilitate corruption, and the dynamics that produce an environment in which corruption can flourish unchecked.  It is not concerned with measuring the amount of funds that are lost, identifying corrupt actors, or estimating the perceptions of corruption by the general public.

The index is organised into five key corruption risk areas: political, financial, personnel, operational, and procurement, which are further broken down into 29 specific defence corruption risks.

Our team of experts draws together evidence from a wide variety of sources and interviewees across 212 indicators to provide a detailed assessment of the integrity of national defence institutions, and awards a score for each country from A to F. In order to provide a broad and comprehensive reflection of these risk areas, the GDI assesses both legal frameworks (de jure) and implementation (de facto), as well as resources and outcomes. Scorecards, overviews, and profiles for each country can be found here.

What is the overall goal of the GDI?

Good practice standards. The GDI provides a framework of good practice that promotes accountable, transparent, and responsible governance in the defence establishment. This standard of good practice stems from our extensive work over the last decade in working towards more accountable defence sectors and highlighting the connection between corruption and instability.

Evidence-based advocacy. The GDI is a useful tool for civil society to collaborate with Ministries of Defence, and military and oversight institutions to build their capacity in transparency and integrity. It provides rigorous evidence-based data for those focusing on the nexus of corruption and defence.

Robust programmatic approaches. Transparency International –  Defence & Security has extensive experience using the index to support reform efforts. This includes: drafting integrity action plans, supporting integrity training workshops, facilitating consultation processes with civil society, and building capacities of parliamentarians to exercise oversight.

Data for countries in West and Central Africa, and the Middle East and North Africa, have recently been released. Subsequent GDI results will be released in 2020, covering Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America, G-20 countries, the Asia Pacific region, East and Southern Africa, and NATO.

Note: The GDI was previously known as the Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index (GI). The Index underwent a major update for the 2020 version, including changes to the methodology and scoring underpinning the project. This means overall country scores from this 2020 version cannot be accurately compared with country scores from previous iterations of the Index. For more information on the GDI methodology, click here.

27 November, London – A court ruling this week that paves the way for civil society in Nigeria to challenge senior politicians over their secretive spending of billions of Nigerian Naira has been praised by Transparency International.

Transparency International and the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Center (CISLAC) in Nigeria have previously called for the scrapping of the unaccountable and secretive “security vote” spending – one of the most durable forms of corruption in Nigeria—saying that they fail to provide real security for citizens.

The security votes issue was explored in a joint report by the groups in May 2018. Camouflaged Cash estimates that security votes in Nigeria total around $670 million annually – more than the annual budget of the Nigerian Army.

Responding to the court decision, Steve Francis OBE, Director of Transparency International’s Defence & Security Programme said:

“This is an important moment in the campaign for transparency in defence and security spending in Nigeria, as well as government accountability more generally. Civil society in Nigeria, including Transparency International’s colleagues in CISLAC, deserve praise for successfully challenging in the courts the government’s refusal to explain how billions of Nigerian Naira were spent over the last twenty years. We see this as another important step in bringing about more openness and accountability in how the country spends taxpayer money on its citizens’ security and defence.”

Contact:

Harvey Gavin

Harvey.gavin@transparency.org.uk

+44 (0)20 3096 7695

++44 (0)79 6456 0340