Show Index: gdi

Defence industry players, elected officials, the defence bureaucracy, and governments in the Middle East are intertwined and serve one another’s interest, often at the expense of US foreign policy outcomes. These mutually-beneficial relationships have contributed to a vicious cycle of conflict and human rights abuses across the Middle East and North Africa, including increased exports of arms and defence services to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates which began under the Obama administration and have ramped up under President Trump.

20th December, London – The complex web of murky pathways through which the American defense industry works to secure permission to export arms to repressive regimes in the Middle East has been laid bare in new research by Transparency International – Defence & Security.

A Mutual Extortion Racket: The Military Industrial Complex and US Foreign Policy reveals how defense industry players, elected officials, the defence bureaucracy, and governments in the Middle East – working through intermediaries such as lobbyists, think tanks, and public relations firms – are intertwined and serve one another’s interest, often at the expense of US foreign policy outcomes.

These mutually-beneficial relationships have contributed to a vicious cycle of conflict and human rights abuses across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), including increased exports of arms and defence services to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates which began under the Obama administration and has ramped up under President Trump.

Steve Francis OBE, Director of Transparency International – Defense & Security said:

“In the midst of the unending war in Yemen and after the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi last year, questions have been asked over why American arms exports to places like Saudi Arabia and the UAE have not only continued, but accelerated. After examining the murky web of lobbying, campaign finance, revolving door employment, and sometimes even downright corruption, it is now clearer how these exports are allowed to continue, despite attempts by many in Congress to stem the flow.

“While much of the system that allows these exports to continue is riddled with a lack of transparency and oversight, there are some areas in which existing strengths can be amplified. We urge Congress and the Executive branch to adopt our recommendations and ensure that arms exports are better aligned with US foreign policy interests and the American defense industry no longer wields excessive influence over policymaking.”

 

The pathways which allow this ‘extortion racket’ to play out include:

• Controversial sweeteners bolted on to defence contracts known as ‘offsets’

Despite rarely making economic sense, these side deals account for US$3 to $7 billion in obligations every year – and the lack of transparency around offsets means they are a notorious conduit for corruption.  A series of leaked emails in 2017 revealed that American defence firms were indirectly funding advocacy campaigns around drones which were friendly to the Saudi and Emirati governments. Money from the US companies was paid directly into an Emirati development fund which was eventually routed to a US think tank who created the campaigns.

• Political campaign donations

‘Dark money’ groups such as the US Chamber of Commerce, the largest American business lobbying organization, are under no obligation to reveal their donors but can contribute to influence political campaigns, especially via so-called Super PACs. According to a defence lobbyist, the Chamber aims to move any discussion about US defense exports “straight down to dollars and jobs in a congressional district” to incentivise members of Congress not to take any steps that could impact arms sales.

• The so-called ‘revolving door’ between high-level jobs in government and the military and senior roles with defense companies or lobbying firms.

After leaving Congress, Republican Howard McKeon set up a lobbying firm which boasts its status as “the only firm led by a former Chairman of two full congressional Committees”. McKeon signed as a registered foreign agent for the Saudi government in 2016 soon after setting up his firm. During his tenure as Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, $10 billion in military sales were approved to Saudi Arabia – a doubling of previous sales to the country.

Rarely is just one of the pathways identified in the report is used and they are often intertwined to magnify influence towards desired policy outcomes.

Simply limiting lobbying and campaign finance contributions is necessary but not enough to rebalance the egregious flaws of this influence system. Our policy recommendations include:

• Establish a ‘Defense Exports Czar’ on the National Security Council to oversee all aspects of security assistance, including defence exports, and assess whether exports align with larger US foreign policy goals.
• Legislate a ban on offset contracts between the American defence industry and foreign governments.
• Re-establish the State Department as the lead agency for all security assistance, including all defense exports, while Congress should demand more insight and transparency into these exports
• Require all contractors and sub-contractors to list their beneficial owners to ensure contract funds are not funnelled to those tied to corrupt politicians, insurgents, terrorists, warlords or criminal actors.
• Establish legislation to limit contributions to super PACs by the defense industry or its intermediaries and prevent anonymous donations; require defence firms to publicly disclose all donations or political activity over $10,000.

 

Notes to Editors:

The report is available to download here.

Transparency International’s newly-released Government Defence Integrity Index scores countries according to the risk of corruption in their defence institutions. Saudi Arabia was ranked F – indicating a critical risk – while the UAE was ranked E, indicating a very high risk.

The American arms industry is the largest in the world. In 2018, American companies were responsible for 57 percent of worldwide arms sales, totalling $226.6 billion.

The sector is also a major force in US manufacturing in employment. In 2017, 10 percent of the $2.22 trillion factory output went to produce weapons sold to the Defence department.

Between 2012 and 2015, the US exported 46 percent of all arms delivered to the Middle East. In 2016, 35 of the 57 arms sales proposed were to countries in the MENA region.

 

Contact:

Interviews are available with the report author.

Harvey Gavin

harvey.gavin@transparency.org.uk

+44 (0)20 3096 7695

++44 (0)79 6456 0340

By Steve Francis OBE, Director of Transparency International – Defence & Security

The Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) is the first global analysis of corruption risks and the existence and enforcement of controls to manage that vulnerability in defence and security institutions, highlighting priority areas for improvement. Key to analysing results from the Index is understanding that the GDI measures corruption risk, not levels of corruption per se.

GDI data will be released in regional waves through 2020. Results from the most recent wave – the Middle East and North Africa – were published in November.

On the whole, the data paints a fairly bleak picture for the region. Tunisia leads the group with an overall grade of “D,” indicating a “high” degree of defence corruption risk, while the other 11 assessed countries received either an “E” or an “F” – signalling “very high” or “critical” levels of risk. Regional averages reflect a similar performance across the individual risk areas – political, financial, personnel, operations, and procurement.

With these findings in mind, what can the analysis of the GDI’s result teach us about protracted cases of armed conflict, political instability, and insecurity that seem to characterise the region?

1. In many cases, high defence corruption risk is symptomatic of wider governance issues.

The GDI’s political risk indicators and aggregated scores on anti-corruption themes examine broader issues of legislative oversight, public debate, access to budgetary information, and civil society activity – issues that don’t just impact the defence sector. Indeed, this area of the assessment highlights essential ingredients for any open and transparent government that engages constructively with its citizens. As most of the assessed MENA countries are governed by authoritarian regimes, we should not be too surprised then that these wider governance challenges also exist in the defence sector. Specifically, our data found a clear lack of external oversight, audit mechanisms, and scrutiny of defence institutions across the region.

Table: MENA region average scores for key political risk indicators and anti-corruption themes

Question	Indicator/Theme	Score	Grade
Q1	Legislative scrutiny of defence laws and policies	15	F
Q3	Defence policy debate	9	F
Q4	CSO engagement with defence and security institutions	15	F
Q6	Public debate of defence issues	23	E
Q13	Defence budget scrutiny	10	F
Q17	External Audit	8	F
Aggregate	Openness to civilian oversight	14	F
Aggregate	Oversight	14	F
Aggregate	Budgets	15	F
Aggregate	Transparency	15	F
Aggregate	Undue influence	19	E

 

2. Countries with the highest defence corruption risk are also significant arms importers.

Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Algeria were three of the world’s top five arms importers from 2014-2018. All three received an “F” grade in the GDI, with Egypt and Algeria receiving the bottom two regional scores (6/100 and 8/100, respectively).

The region has gaps in export controls, with only Lebanon and Palestine having ratified the Arms Trade Treaty, in addition to related risks like a lack of regulation around lobbying in defence and virtually no transparency around defence spending.

Although major arms exporters to the region like the United States have rules against the transfer of arms to third parties, end-use monitoring is not always consistent or comprehensive. This is especially troubling given that top arms importers in the region are either directly involved in or are arming parties to the devastating conflicts in both Yemen and Libya.

3. Low-scoring countries also exhibit high corruption risk by blurring the line between business and defence.

While the region as a whole scored poorly on indicators relating to the beneficial ownership (47/100) and scrutiny of military-owned businesses (44/100), these risks are greatest in countries with extensive military-run industries and/or significant natural resources. In Egypt for example, the military owns lucrative businesses across industries ranging from food and agriculture to mining, but has few controls in place for regulating these ventures. In Algeria, a largely state-owned economy renowned for high levels of corruption and patronage, there are a range of potential implications now that the military has stepped in to fill the vacuum following the ousting of President Bouteflika in March 2019 following mass public unrest.

The Gulf monarchies offer an example of how defence and business can overlap at the level of the individual. In the assessment for Saudi Arabia, we found that members of the royal family who serve in senior military positions also have controlling or financial interests in businesses related to the country’s petroleum sector. In the UAE as well, our research found that Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, is also the Chairman of a company dealing in natural resources.

On the other end of the spectrum, the GDI found that in Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia, defence and security institutions do not own businesses of any significant scale, thereby removing a significant source of corruption risk.

 

As the GDI data shows, the risk of defence corruption in the MENA region is a serious concern with the potential to exacerbate ongoing conflict and instability. However, robust tools like the GDI can help governments to identify gaps in safeguarding practices – the first step in a process towards reform – while supporting civil society and oversight actors in countries across the region in conducting evidence-based advocacy.

6 December, Niamey – Security and stability in Niger are threatened by high levels of corruption risk in its national defence sector, according to new research by Transparency International – Defence & Security.

Niger’s defence sector scores poorly in the 2020 Government Defence Integrity Index, which is today being launched in Niamey. Receiving a majority of E and F grades, indicating either a “very high” or “critical” risk of defence corruption, the analysis assesses corruption risk across five key areas: political, financial, operations, personnel and procurement.

But Niger’s overall score of 22/100 places it above the regional average of 18/100, with levels of corruption risk in the country’s political, financial and procurement categories lower than in the region, but higher in terms of personnel and operations.

Steve Francis, OBE, Director of Transparency International – Defence & Security, said:

“In recent years, Niger has become increasingly affected by the conflict and insecurity in neighbouring Mali, which has quickly spread across the Sahel. With Niger now a key member of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, contributing over a thousand troops to the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali and receiving increasing amounts of military and technical assistance from foreign donors, the country is on the frontline of the regional struggle against extremist groups.

“Given the empirical link between corruption and conflict and the corrosive effect of corruption on defence capabilities, it is essential for Niger to accelerate its efforts to improve the governance of the defence sector and strengthen civilian democratic oversight of the defence apparatus. We urge the Nigerien government to improve the access to defence information of legislative and oversight bodies and take steps towards improving transparency and external oversight in procurement processes. Building the integrity and effectiveness of Niger’s defence sector will enhance its ability to respond to multiplying regional security threats and bolster public trust in defence and security institutions.

“With high corruption risks across national defence sectors in West Africa, tools like our Government Defence Integrity Index are more important than ever. By highlighting areas where safeguards against corruption are weak or non-existent, campaigners on the ground and reform minded military leaders and politicians can use these results to push for real change. Taking action to improve transparency and closing the loopholes which allow corruption to thrive is a critical step in building effective and accountable defence and security forces.”

 

These findings come against a backdrop of rising insecurity in Niger and the Sahel more broadly. Attacks by extremist groups against civilians and Nigerien defence and security forces are rising, while the protracted conflicts in Mali and Libya are increasingly spilling across the border into Niger. Mounting instability in Burkina Faso, Northern Nigeria and the Lake Chad region are also threatening to seriously impact the security of populations along Niger’s southern border and are turning the landlocked nation into a critical base in the fight against violent extremism.

Despite recent promising government initiatives and reforms, attempts to improve defence governance in Niger are hindered by high levels of secrecy and defence exceptionalism, which severely limit oversight and control of defence institutions by parliament and audit mechanisms.

The capacity of the National Assembly to hold the government to account is hampered by a lack of technical expertise and limited access to information, whilst a general lack of engagement between the defence establishment and civil society further limits the scope of civilian democratic oversight.

Financial oversight is also curtailed by the lack of a detailed defence budget made available to the legislature. Even the parliamentary Defence and Security Commission is presented with only abbreviated information when it comes to spending on secret items and military intelligence, whilst audit mechanisms are limited in terms of capacity and access to information. This lack of oversight is mirrored in Niger’s defence procurement process, with many purchases excluded from normal public procurement procedures. Moreover, reports from the Inspector General, along with the military acquisition plan are strictly confidential, thereby hugely hindering external control.

Personnel management would be improved through a greater emphasis on addressing corruption, for instance through revamped Codes of Conduct and specific anti-corruption training which are currently lacking. Equally, the nomination and recruitment processes at higher levels are shrouded in secrecy, opening the door for nepotistic practices.

Finally, Niger’s defence sector scores very poorly in terms of operational risk, with its military doctrine lacking an appreciation of corruption as a strategic threat during deployments.

At a time of growing regional instability, Transparency International – Defence & Security urges the Nigerien government to consider heightening efforts to improve civilian democratic oversight of the defence sector and strengthening the integrity of the armed forces to better respond to the security threats with which it is faced.

 

Notes to editors:

The full, country-specific Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) results for Niger and West Africa as a whole are available at https://ti-defence.org/gdi/

The GDI assesses the existence, effectiveness and enforcement of institutional and informal controls to manage the risk of corruption in defence and security institutions.

Our team of experts draws together evidence from a wide variety of sources and interviewees across 77 indicators to provide a detailed assessment of the integrity of national defence institutions, and awards a score for each country from A to F.

The GDI was previously known as the Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index (GI). The Index underwent a major update for the 2020 version, including changes to the methodology and scoring underpinning the project. This means overall country scores from this 2020 version cannot be accurately compared with country scores from previous iterations of the Index.

Subsequent GDI results will be released in 2020, covering Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America, G-20 countries, the Asia Pacific region, East and Southern Africa, and NATO+.

 

Contact:

Harvey Gavin

harvey.gavin@transparency.org.uk

+44 (0)20 3096 7695

++44 (0)79 6456 0340

By Stephanie Trapnell, Head of Research, and Michael Ofori-Mensah PhD, Project Manager

How to govern military power presents one of the great global challenges of our age. Powerful, secretive and responsible for the world’s most destructive capabilities, when the governance of defence fails, it fails spectacularly, often leading to conflict and further instability. And yet many national defence sectors lack the basic governance standards of other public sectors. Reform programmes are difficult to steward through to success, but the rewards of doing so can improve military effectiveness and help reconnect armed forces with the societies they serve.

To aid this process, Transparency International has developed the evidence-based Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI). It is the first global analysis of corruption risks and the existence and enforcement of controls to manage that vulnerability in defence and security institutions, highlighting priority areas for improvement.

The 2020 iteration of the GDI focuses on 89 countries, selected based on the following criteria:

• their significant and/or high-profile roles in the global arms trade
• being at risk for political or defence-related instability
• undergoing reforms that were expected to result in changed circumstances for defence integrity.

As such, it has a crucial role to play in driving global defence reform. The GDI is designed to be a tool for governments seeking to improve their integrity protocols and a platform to share best practice with civil society, international organisations, the media and country investors, identifying where they need to push for change in the sector.

Overall, our experience to date shows that where governments have used the GDI as a roadmap for reforms, it can make a strong contribution to bringing about positive changes and mitigate the risks corrupt practices can pose to a state’s legitimacy and ability to respond to threats.

What does the GDI measure?

The GDI measures corruption risk, not levels of corruption per se. It assesses that risk in the entire defence and security sector within a country, which involves evaluating the factors that facilitate corruption, and the dynamics that produce an environment in which corruption can flourish unchecked.  It is not concerned with measuring the amount of funds that are lost, identifying corrupt actors, or estimating the perceptions of corruption by the general public.

The index is organised into five key corruption risk areas: political, financial, personnel, operational, and procurement, which are further broken down into 29 specific defence corruption risks.

Our team of experts draws together evidence from a wide variety of sources and interviewees across 212 indicators to provide a detailed assessment of the integrity of national defence institutions, and awards a score for each country from A to F. In order to provide a broad and comprehensive reflection of these risk areas, the GDI assesses both legal frameworks (de jure) and implementation (de facto), as well as resources and outcomes. Scorecards, overviews, and profiles for each country can be found here.

What is the overall goal of the GDI?

Good practice standards. The GDI provides a framework of good practice that promotes accountable, transparent, and responsible governance in the defence establishment. This standard of good practice stems from our extensive work over the last decade in working towards more accountable defence sectors and highlighting the connection between corruption and instability.

Evidence-based advocacy. The GDI is a useful tool for civil society to collaborate with Ministries of Defence, and military and oversight institutions to build their capacity in transparency and integrity. It provides rigorous evidence-based data for those focusing on the nexus of corruption and defence.

Robust programmatic approaches. Transparency International –  Defence & Security has extensive experience using the index to support reform efforts. This includes: drafting integrity action plans, supporting integrity training workshops, facilitating consultation processes with civil society, and building capacities of parliamentarians to exercise oversight.

Data for countries in West and Central Africa, and the Middle East and North Africa, have recently been released. Subsequent GDI results will be released in 2020, covering Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America, G-20 countries, the Asia Pacific region, East and Southern Africa, and NATO.

 

Note: The GDI was previously known as the Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index (GI). The Index underwent a major update for the 2020 version, including changes to the methodology and scoring underpinning the project. This means overall country scores from this 2020 version cannot be accurately compared with country scores from previous iterations of the Index. For more information on the GDI methodology, click here.

25 November, London – Security and stability across the Middle East and North Africa continues to be undermined by the risk of corruption in defence institutions, according to new research by Transparency International – Defence & Security.

11 of the 12 Middle East and North Africa states assessed in the 2020 Government Defence Integrity Index released today received E or F grades, indicating either a “very high” or “critical” risk of defence corruption. Only Tunisia performed better, scoring a D.

These findings come against a backdrop of insecurity and fragility in the region. Mass protests – driven by grievances including corruption and financial mismanagement by government – continue in Egypt, Iraq and Lebanon. Meanwhile protracted armed conflicts in Syria, Yemen and Libya show no sign of ending.

Steve Francis OBE, Director of Transparency International – Defence & Security, said:

The Middle East and North Africa remains one of the most conflict-riven regions in the world and this instability has a major impact on international security. While some states have made some improvements in their anti-corruption safeguards, the overall picture is one of stagnation and in some cases regression. Given the empirical link between corruption and insecurity, these results make worrying reading.

Military institutions across the region continue to conduct much of their business under a shroud of secrecy and away from even the most basic public scrutiny or legislative oversight. This lack of accountability fuels mistrust in security services and governments, which in turn feeds instability.

With the regional picture looking bleak, tools like our Government Defence Integrity Index are more important than ever. By highlighting areas where safeguards against corruption are weak or non-existent, campaigners on the ground and reform minded military leaders and politicians can use these results to push for real change. Taking action to improve transparency and close loopholes which allow corruption to thrive would improve public trust and bolster national security.

Defence sectors across the region continue to suffer from excessive secrecy, and a lack of oversight and transparency, the research found. Meanwhile, defence spending in the region continues to surge to record levels.

The countries with defence sectors at a ‘critical’ risk of corruption are Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, as there is virtually no accountability or transparency of defence and security institutions. Many of these countries are either major arms importers or benefit from significant international military aid.

In Lebanon, a lack of clear independent auditing mechanisms and gaps between anti-corruption laws adopted in the last two years and their implementation contributed to the country’s “very high” risk status, despite the Lebanese Armed Forces demonstrating high levels of integrity and a willingness to remain neutral and avoid using excessive against protesters.

Tunisia was the only country in the region to rank higher, with new whistleblower protections, improved oversight and public commitments to promoting integrity in the armed forces contributing to its score. But the continued use of counter-terrorism justifications combined with an ingrained culture of secrecy within the defence sector prevented Tunisia from scoring higher.

 

Country	Risk banding
Tunisia	High risk
Lebanon	Very high risk
Palestine
Kuwait
UAE
Algeria	Critical risk
Egypt
Jordan
Morocco
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia

 

Notes to editors:

The full, country-specific Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) results for the Middle East and North Africa will be available here

The GDI assesses the existence, effectiveness and enforcement of institutional and informal controls to manage the risk of corruption in defence and security institutions.

Our team of experts draws together evidence from a wide variety of sources and interviewees across 77 indicators to provide a detailed assessment of the integrity of national defence institutions, and awards a score for each country from A to F.

The GDI was previously known as the Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index (GI). The Index underwent a major update for the 2020 version, including changes to the methodology and scoring underpinning the project. This means overall country scores from this 2020 version cannot be accurately compared with country scores from previous iterations of the Index.

Subsequent GDI results will be released in 2020, covering Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America, G-20 countries, the Asia Pacific region, East and Southern Africa, and NATO+.

 

Contact:

Harvey Gavin
Harvey.gavin@transparency.org.uk
+44 (0)20 3096 7695
++44 (0)79 6456 0340

 

Mallary Gelb
mallary.gelb@transparency.org.uk
+44 (0)20 3096 7695
++44 (0)79 6456 0340

Corruption is widely recognized as one of the fundamental drivers of conflict in Mali. A lack of accountability to the population and a failure to address internal patronage networks has fed into two coup d’états, human rights abuses and the permissive environment for transnational trafficking and organized criminal activity that has fuelled regional conflict. In the meantime, by reducing the operational effectiveness of the Malian armed forces, corruption undermines the state’s ability to field a defence and security apparatus that can guarantee the population protection from insurgent groups, armed violence, or the resurgence of civil war.

Whilst the lack of safety and insecurity linked to conflict is one of the top five most important problems reported by Malians across the country, weak governance in the defence and security sector has hugely corroded public confidence in the government and state security institutions.

This mistrust has been exacerbated by a high level of secrecy and a lack of transparency in the defence sector that have meant that the otherwise vibrant Malian civil society has been unable to provide robust oversight over defence policies, or play a role in combating defence corruption. Civil society in turn has limited capacity to oversee the sector’s activities and requires increased expertise on defence governance and accountability to develop well-evidenced and holistic reform recommendations. At the same time, it lacks opportunities to engage with officials at the level required to catalyze reforms within state institutions. This has given the Malian army the freedom to act largely unmonitored in the North and other insecure areas at a time when the country’s security and integrity is challenged on a daily basis.

Building on our expertise as well as on inputs from Malian civil society organisations from across the country, this report will provide best practice guidelines and recommendations which are designed to diminish the space for corruption and to improve the governance and institutional strength of Mali’s defence sector.

The French Translation of this report can be downloaded here.

October 24, Bamako – Mali’s defence sector has undergone a comprehensive health check in new research from Transparency International – Defence and Security (TI-DS), which stresses the need for urgent action to tackle corruption in order to enable the military to better respond to Mali’s numerous security threats.

Building Integrity in Mali’s Defence and Security Sector assesses the strength of institutional safeguards to corruption in the Malian defence sector and highlights weaknesses in key institutions which have created an environment in which corrupt practices have been able to thrive.

As part of TI-DS’ work to promote integrity in defence sectors across West Africa, this report is designed as an advocacy tool for Malian civil society organisations and campaign groups.

By highlighting the drivers and enablers of corruption and providing tailored recommendations and guidelines, TI-DS offers a roadmap to improved governance and a more accountable military.

Steve Francis OBE, Director of Transparency International – Defence and Security, said:

“Corruption and conflict go hand in hand and their coexistence feeds violence and insecurity. Nowhere is this vicious cycle more evident than in Mali where a lack of integrity and accountability has fuelled two coup d’états and weakened the security forces further.“

“In order to tackle the current security crisis, and to protect the population from future threats, the corruption undermining public trust in the military and reducing its operational effectiveness must be weeded out. We urge the Malian authorities to consider adopting and implementing these policy proposals to help reduce and even eliminate some of the primary enablers of corruption in the defence and security sector. The prize for doing so a military force that the people of Mali want and deserve.”

Key recommendations include:

· Greater oversight of defence purchases and finances. Mali’s defence institutions would benefit from greater oversight and controls over defence purchases and finances. This would enable the efficient use of precious resources and ensure that the Malian defence and security forces are provided with the right equipment to respond to the country’s security threats.

· Harness the powers of the National Assembly. Although the Malian Constitution provides the National Assembly with adequate powers to scrutinise the actions of the executive, it needs further means and the expertise to perform proper oversight over defence. Moreover, access to information remains limited as the overclassification of information curtails its capacities to monitor defence activities and scrutinise budgets.

· Strengthen the integrity of the sector. Mali’s defence establishment suffers from a lack of accountability and transparency in human resource and asset management which has negatively impacted the integrity of the defence apparatus. More transparent, objective and clearly defined human resource and asset management processes will help professionalise and improve the effectiveness and integrity of the armed forces.

This research comes at a crucial time for Mali. Since the near-collapse of the Malian military in 2012, government troops have been battling jihadist militants in the north of the country.

This continued insurgency has prompted local militias to take measures to protect their own interests, further complicating the security situation for the government and exacerbating the suffering of Mali’s citizens.

Note to Editors:

Building Integrity in Mali’s Defence and Security Sector is being officially launched today, October 24, in Bamako.

Contact:

Harvey Gavin

Harvey.gavin@transparency.org.uk

+44 (0)20 3096 7695

++44 (0)79 6456 0340

Transparency International is the civil society organisation leading the fight against corruption

Ghana is often seen as the good governance frontrunner in West Africa. The country is also a strong contributor to international peacekeeping missions, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, and the Accra-based Ghana Armed Forces Staff and Command College (GAFCSC) and Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training College (KAIPTC) are respected training hubs hosting military personnel from across the region.

However, the Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) 2020 for Ghana highlighted key areas of continued corruption risk within the defence sector, including a lack of transparency in procurement, limited oversight over key defence issues, and limited acknowledgement of corruption as a strategic issue on military operations.

Our project, which began in March 2019 and is funded by the UK Department for International Development, aims to work with national Ghanaian defence institutions, civil society and media organisations, and parliamentarians to strengthen their anti-corruption expertise and their capacity to implement effective change. Key project activities include conducting Leadership Days for senior defence officials to introduce them to corruption risks and best practice; supporting national civil society and media in engaging in coordinated advocacy activities; conducting capacity-building workshops for parliamentarians responsible for defence oversight; and working with KAIPTC and GAFCSC to strengthen anti-corruption training for military personnel.

In strengthening the expertise and capacity of Ghanaian institutions, Transparency International – Defence & Security and the Ghana Integrity Initiative aim to support the country’s efforts in becoming a regional lead on defence anti-corruption issues and improving the integrity of their international peacebuilding activities.

Corruption is widely recognized as one of the fundamental drivers of conflict in Mali and a lack of accountability to the population from the defence and security apparatus has fed into the unrest. With the support of the UNDEF, and in partnership with Transparency International’s National Chapter in Mali CRI-2002, we are seeking to reduce the risk of corruption in the Malian defence sector, through strengthening civil society’s expertise on defence accountability and good governance and building its capacity to influence anti-corruption reforms in the sector.

In many countries, there is a critical disconnect and lack of communication and understanding between civil society and defence and security institutions which results in very limited interaction and engagement. This hinders the effectiveness and accountability of defence institutions and restricts civilian understanding and knowledge of the sector which can lead to a shortfall in trust between the two.

We have conducted detailed research into institutional safeguards in Malian defence institutions and held a series of regional focus group discussions to form a solid evidence base to help build the capability and coordination of civil society advocacy efforts for greater defence accountability. The creation of a national Civil Society Organisations (CSO) Forum specialised on defence and security issues, made up of 30 Malian CSOs with its own structure and strategy has helped to coordinate civil society efforts and establish a credible platform with which to engage with the defence sector. We have also worked to build relationships with key government agencies in Mali and organised leadership days, bringing together senior defence officials with civil society actors to bridge the gap between the two and foster consensus on necessary reforms. This approach has been complemented by an ongoing media campaign which is raising awareness as to the detrimental effects of defence sector corruption among the wider Malian population.

TI-DS in Mali

Corruption had an undeniable impact on Nigeria’s security situation. Corruption in the defence sector, in particular, has resulted in the waste of billions of dollars’ worth of public funds through corrupt defence procurement practices and the abuse of the opaque security funding system known as “security votes”. This public money could have been otherwise more productively directed towards countering security threats and building a modern and efficient defence force. Corruption within the Nigeria defence sector arguably inhibited the ability of Nigerian armed forces to effectively tackle the insurgent threat in the North East as well as respond to the oil bunkering in the Niger Delta, the conflict in the Middle Belt and the threat of maritime piracy in the Gulf of Guinea – reports of ghost soldiers, the skimming of soldiers’ salaries, and the procurement of faulty and outdated weaponry suggest misconduct within the armed forces that affected operational effectiveness.

In cooperation with our local chapter in Nigeria, the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC), we are conducting a project aiming to Increase Transparency, Accountability and Integrity in the Nigerian Defence Sector (ITAI). ITAI’s objectives focus firstly on building a culture of integrity within Nigeria’s armed forces and civilian defence structures by working to develop an understanding of anti-corruption as crucial to achieving stability, and by supporting internal anti-corruption efforts.

Secondly, ITAI aims to strengthen civilian efforts to conduct effective oversight over the defence sector. We are therefore working with parliamentarians responsible for overseeing defence, civil society organisations and media representatives. Our aim is to not only strengthen these actors’ capacity and expertise on defence oversight but to also work with them to generate a strong and informed public discourse on defence corruption risks in Nigeria.

Our ITAI project builds on existing work conducted by Transparency International – Defence & Security and CISLAC in Nigeria through a previous project entitled Strengthening Accountability in the Nigerian Defence Sector (SANDS).

Lebanon has avoided the spill over from the conflict in Syria, but currently faces rising regional tensions which some fear could lead to conflict in Lebanon. At the same time, military expenditure has risen to 5% of the country’s share of GDP, and close to 14% of government spending; one of the highest shares of the government’s spending. While the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) benefit from support which generally transcends sectarian lines, the institution faces high risks of corruption due to limited parliamentary oversight and access to information, amplified by the lack of transparency to citizens and accountability beyond the armed forces. Strengthening the integrity of Lebanese defence institutions is crucial to guaranteeing an armed forces that can effectively respond to threats and is accountable to the Lebanese people.

Lebanon’s security situation remains fragile, and corruption a systemic weakness. The LAF have been keen to engage, and exhibit some regional best practices. Transparency International strives to capitalise on these best practices and the ongoing movement towards reform to encourage strengthening integrity within the armed forces.

We have therefore been working in partnership with the Lebanese Transparency Association (LTA), Transparency International’s chapter in Lebanon, since 2018. The primary aim of our Lebanon country programme is to promote transparency and the enhancement of integrity mechanisms within the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Our approach is to collaborate, pursue dialogue, and engage with the LAF, as the Lebanese government seeks to demonstrate its broader commitment to reform and to countering corruption.

We are refining plans to achieve policy and institutional changes following the launch of the Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI), including strengthening anti-corruption reforms and promoting transparency and accountability within the LAF. Alongside this, we will collaborate to build the capacity of civil society to engage with the government, military and international community on defence corruption issues. We believe that raising stakeholder capacity is crucial to tangible progress within Lebanese defence institutions and, in turn, to strengthen the government’s ability to respond to its own national security threats.

Relevant publications